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ABSTRACT
Creating engaging, interactive, and immersive synthetic characters is a difficult task and
evaluating the success of a synthetic character is often even more difficult. The later problem is
solved by extending Turing’s Imitation Game thusly: computational construct should be
evaluated based on the criteria of how well the character can mimic a human. In order to
accomplish a successful evaluation of the proposed metric, synthetic characters must be
consistently believable and capable of role-appropriate emotional expression. The author
believes traditional synthetic characters must be improved to meet this goal.
For a synthetic character to be believable, human users must be able to perceive a link
between the mental state of the character and its behaviors. That is to say, synthetic characters
must possess intentionality. In addition to intentionality, the mental state of the character must
be human-like in order to provide an adequate frame of reference for the human users’ internal
simulations, to wit, the character’s mental state must be comprised of a synthetic model of
personality, of personality dynamics, and of cognition, each of which must be psychologically
valid and of sufficient fidelity for the type of character represented. The author proposes that
synthetic characters possessing these three models are more accurately described as synthetic
personalities.
The author proposes and implements computational models of personality, personality
dynamics, and cognition in order to evaluate the psychological veracity of these models and
computational equivalence between the models and the implementation as a first step in the
process of creating believable synthetic personalities.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Since the beginnings of electronic computation, scientists have been seeking an answer to
the question: “Can machines think?” In 1950, Alan Turing imagined a way to answer this
difficult question (Turing, 1950). Turing proposed an “imitation game”, in which there are three
participants, two humans and the machine to be tested. One human plays the role of an
interrogator or judge, while the other human and the machine intelligence play the role of
respondents. In this game, the question “Can machines think?” may be answered in the positive
if the interrogator is unable to determine which of the two respondents is human. This
introduces an important concept: computational constructs should be evaluated based on the
criteria of how well these constructs can mimic a human.
Over fifty years later, a new form of computational construct that is consistent with
Turing’s notions has emerged in an effort to create more realistic avatars in digital media.
Generally referred to as virtual or synthetic characters, these are computational characters with at
least enough autonomy to react to situations or scenarios in a manner that is engaging to a human
participant and that supports the suspension of disbelief.
Believable, engaging characters have the ability to capture our attention and leave a
lasting impression (Rickel, 2001). A character is defined by WordNet as “an actor's portrayal of
someone in a play” whereas the American Heritage Dictionary defines a character as “a person
portrayed in an artistic piece, such as a drama or a novel.” Therefore, a synthetic character
should be defined as a virtual portrayal of some person or virtual entity, as opposed to a synthetic
person. By this definition, synthetic characters are not required to have emotions, intellect, or
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human-like traits, but only be able to emulate these characteristics. That is, if the characters
themselves, and the character’s emulation of these human-like traits are believable.
One of the strongest methods of communication, teaching, and human interaction is the art
of story telling. A sense of story (i.e., the elements of plot and characterization) is crucial in the
creation of engagement and immersion (Douglas and Hargadon, 2000). In this regard, wellformed synthetic characters can provide this sense of story and harnesses the power of 'make
believe' in digital media, by giving believable and occasionally surprising performances
(Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998). Further, these characters can be used in interactive story
telling, can be implemented as a part of intelligent tutoring systems for education and training,
enrich game play in video games, populate synthetic environments, and to develop intelligent
interfaces between humans and computers.
Synthetic characters offer the potential for a variety of distinct new capabilities to digital
media. These capabilities include:
1. Interactive Demonstration
2. Navigational Guidance
3. Gaze and Gesture
4. Nonverbal feedback
5. Conversational Signals
6. Emotions and Personality
7. Virtual Teammates
8. Story and Character (Rickel, 2001)
These capabilities can be exploited to further the level of immersion and engagement felt by the
human user. Some characters may motivate the human participant by conveying excitement and
2

enthusiasm, some by providing familiar nonverbal and verbal signs of encouragement, and some
by building on the strengths of fictional character development to create a sense of interest and
leave a memorable impression.
Yoon et al. (2000) states: “Human participants can comfortably interact with interactive
characters only when they feel they can understand what is going on in the character’s mind” and
that “the character’s actions must be driven by its beliefs and desires.” These statements address
a concept known as intentionality, that is, the perceived link between a character’s action and its
beliefs and desires. In order for this link to be perceived and believed, the character must be able
to communicate appropriately and consistently express emotional and social cues (Rousseau and
Hayes-Roth, 1998).
In general terms, communication between humans may be either lexical or creative in
nature (Poggi, 2001). A lexical system is one that relies on a lexicon of syntax-semantics pairs,
while a creative system is one that relies on a set of encoded rules to create new syntax for a
given meaning or to decipher a meaning from a given syntax (Poggi, 2001). Any lexical system
and any creative system developed for a synthetic character must operate within the scope of the
established role of the character and must be appropriate for the situation.
For the purposes of the present work, let lexical intentionality be defined as “expressing
the internal beliefs and desires of a synthetic character either through a lexicon of natural
language or through a lexicon of gesture, gaze, and expression.”
In natural language, the basic ontology of words and meanings, and the parts of words
and their meanings are “lexical atoms” (Poggi, 2001). Equipping a synthetic character with
lexical verbal skills is necessary, but clearly not sufficient. Without some means of establishing
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the context of the lexical atom, in many cases it is impossible to distinguish its semantics,
beyond iconic, innocuous phrases.
For the purposes of the present work, let creative intentionality be defined as “expressing
the internal beliefs and desires of a synthetic character either through a set of rules that allows
the creation of syntax-semantics pairs for natural language, gestures, gaze, expression, or any
combination of these.”
With respect to natural language, rules of composition are representative of creative
communication (Poggi, 2001). These rules give us the ability to create new words from atomic
parts, sentences from lexical atoms, and corpora from sentences. A creative system for verbal
communication is built upon the lexical system of the language used. Given that, the creative
system is necessary and sufficient to allow creative intentionality in synthetic characters.
It should be noted that combining any lexical atoms, even two atoms from disparate
lexicons, in accordance with a creative rule set constitutes creative intentionality. For example,
humans routinely combine gestures and expressions to create new meanings. Take the case of
waving. What is communicated by waving while smiling is certainly different than what is
communicated by waving while frowning. The ability to create compound communications by
concatenating gesture adds depth to the synthetic character's ability for expression, and therefore
increases the intentionality of the character.
Creating a synthetic character that displays lexical and creative intentionality is a difficult
and complex task. This goal cannot be accomplished by brute force since the interactions
between the human user and the synthetic character will be too complex to reliably pre-script all
the possible exchanges (Yoon et al., 2000). Any synthetic character designed to successfully
mimic a human must implement a cognitive model of sufficient depth to allow creative
4

communication in order to support lexical and creative intentionality. However, cognitive
models alone are insufficient.
Reilly and Bates (1995) identify personality as the most important feature to add to a
synthetic character in order to foster believability. Further, interesting personalities heighten the
immersion and engagement of human participants in traditional media (Rousseau and HayesRoth, 1998). Research shows that people are willing to respond to machines that are endowed
with human-like personality characteristics as if the machines actually have personalities
(Reeves and Nash, 1996), hence by adding personality to synthetic characters, immersion and
engagement with these characters is increased.
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth (1998) opine that personality traits “correspond to patterns of
behavior and modes of thinking that determine a person’s adjustment to the environment.”
WordNet defines personality as the “complex of all the attributes - behavioral, temperamental,
emotional, mental - that characterize a unique individual.” Similarly, Webster's Revised
Unabridged dictionary defines personality as “that which constitutes distinction of person –
individualness”. The American Heritage Dictionary offers that personality is “the distinctive
traits of a person.” Hence, a synthetic personality may be defined as a composite of
characteristics that make the entity unique. Certainly, beliefs, desires, emotions, and reactions to
social cues, are part of the characteristics that create individuality. Therefore, personality may be
seen as the over-riding force that dictates a synthetic personality’s actions.
The author's primary focus is on creating synthetic characters powerful enough to
immerse and engage a human user, and versatile enough to work across multiple problem
domains and respond appropriately to novel situations. In other words, the author seeks to create
a synthetic character capable of lexical and creative intentionality, i.e., a machine that is able to
5

appear to be human to its human users. The author believes that in order to create a compelling
synthetic character that is able to consistently function in a human manner; it must be able to go
further than appearing to have personality, intention, intellect, and emotion. It must have them.

Characteristics of Effective Synthetic Characters
To be effective, synthetic characters must be believable, comfortable, and capable of real
time interaction (Kille and Warwick, 2001). They should be adaptable and capable of
responding to user's cognitive styles, implicit preferences, and explicit responses, as well. In
order to create the highest levels of realism, engagement, and immersion, synthetic characters
must be able to model intellect. Intelligence is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as
the “faculty of thought and reason, or the ability to acquire and apply knowledge.” Similarly,
Webster's Revised Dictionary defines intelligence as “the capacity to know or understand.” By
combining these definitions, intelligence may be defined in part by the ability to cogitate. The
author uses the following definition of cognition: “the collection of mental processes and
activities used in perceiving, learning, remembering, thinking, and understanding, and the act of
using these processes” (Ashcraft, 1998). Therefore, the artificial intelligence component of any
synthetic character must contain a suite of functions that allow the character to perceive, learn,
remember, think, and understand.
Recent discoveries in the fields of Cognitive Science, Psychology and Neurology offer
support to the importance of emotion to human intelligence (El Nasir et al., 1999; Chen et al.,
2001 a). Hence, these characters must be able to model appropriate emotive components that are
applicable to the character (El Nasir et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2001 a; Gratch and Marsella, 2001).
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As mentioned previously, synthetic characters must be able to convey intentionality and
communicate effectively. Since the character will be communicating with a human, and
therefore must be able to function in an incomplete and unpredictable problem domain, the
character must be highly adaptable and robust (Yoon et al., 2000). However, it is not sufficient
for the synthetic character to be adaptable; the adaptation must be believable (Yoon et al., 2000).
That is to say, the adaptation to user input must be shown in incremental and appropriate
responses to the user's attempts to impact the interaction.
Fundamentally, a synthetic character must be more than a pre-scripted character, since is
it very difficult for a designer to predict all possible scenarios and develop appropriate responses
for them (Yoon et al., 2000). At minimum, it must be a reactive system, that is, a system in
which no prediction takes place, but rather the system waits and processes user inputs without
context. However, those synthetic characters that are able to perform anticipatory planning
could be the most effective. In an anticipatory system, the synthetic character uses prediction to
narrow the scope of the problem domain and to establish frames of reference to proactively
eliminate possible interpretations that do not make sense contextually.
In summary, to be effective in its role, any synthetic character must:
1. be believable
2. be capable of real-time interaction
3. make the human user feel comfortable interacting with it
4. respond to the user’s cognitive style and react appropriately to the user’s implicit
and explicit preferences
5. be adaptable
6. learn
7

7. have persistent memory
8. model emotion
9. communicate effectively
10. anticipate the user.

Common Roles Of Synthetic Characters
Synthetic characters enrich human experience with digital media. They can be used to
tell stories interactively, develop intelligent tutoring systems for education and training, enrich
the engagement in video games, populate synthetic environments, and to develop intelligent
interfaces between humans and computers.
Generally speaking, synthetic characters should be able to demonstrate tasks in a virtual
environment while providing commentary describing the task. By using adaptive planning, the
character may also respond to interruptions from the user, and tailor its demonstration to the
level of the user; thereby spending the most time on subjects about which the user has the most
questions.
Synthetic characters also play a role in navigation through the simulation or information
space. While navigation is generally construed to mean navigation of a virtual, threedimensional space that has a real-world counterpart, it applies to navigation of computer systems
as well. Not only do synthetic agents lead users to functionality they desire (e.g., by navigating
menus, directory structures, etc.), but also allow for faster and more targeted traversal of
informational spaces.
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For example, in intelligent tutoring systems that do not use embodied synthetic
characters, arrows and highlight colors are frequently used to direct a student's attention.
Embodied synthetic characters, however, can direct the user's attention with more natural
seeming gestures or by directing its gaze at the item in question
Humans use nonverbal feedback cues to influence one another in every interaction.
Facial expressions, body language, gaze, and gestures are used in concert to express opinions and
communicate level of engagement.
For example, characters may smile and nod to convey praise or agreement, look puzzled
to express confusion, or employ virtual clowning to show excitement and enthusiasm and to
further engage the user in the interface. By providing appropriate levels of emphasis, synthetic
characters will be viewed as more life-like. Also, conversational signals used by the character
will assist in regulating turn-taking and will provide back-channel feedback to the human user.
Although not within the scope this dissertation, it is important that synthetic characters are also
endowed with this capability and related research in this area will be discussed.
By presenting the user with an interface that they believe to have identifiable personality
and emotions, engagement with the system may be increased. Additionally, problems that might
prove frustrating to the user in a traditional interface may be cast in a humorous light by a
character's personality.
Since humans are social creatures and often motivated and informed by social cues,
synthetic characters may also be used to bolster the efficacy of video games, simulations, and
other forms of interactive media by providing us with virtual teammates, virtual opponents,
virtual mentors and coaches, guides, by sharing ownership of tasks and duties, and by offering
encouragement, an enthusiastic ear, and a supportive environment, etc. Level of effort can be
9

elevated and creativity can be sparked by a sense of play, interaction, and companionship.
Additionally, leadership skills may be trained and polished using a system of synthetic
teammates endowed with human-like personalities.
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CHAPTER TWO: FROM ACTORS TO CHARACTERS TO
PERSONALITIES
A plethora of research into synthetic characters is ongoing in the academic sector, the
private sector, and in government-sponsored programs, such as that conducted by Bates, 1994;
Blumberg, 1995; Chen et al., 2001a; Chen et al., 2001b; El Nassir, 1999; Gratch and Marsella,
2001; Hayes-Roth, 1997; Hibbard, 2002; Kshirsagar, 2002; Paiva et al., 2001; Rickel, 2001;
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998, Yoon et al., 2000, and many, many others. This research
varies in the degree of importance placed on creating a construct that actually functions as
humans do, versus a construct that appears to function as humans do.
The field of Artificial Intelligence has struggled to find an adequate definition of human
intelligence and “the human mind”. For many years, researchers tried to model human
intelligence by modeling the logical brain in isolation. Additionally, research has become
increasingly granular, often targeting a specific mental function or suite of functionality, to the
exclusion of the concept of “the mind” as a whole. This research is certainly valuable, however,
and is used by the author as a suite of skills or a set of brushes that might be used by a painter to
create an independent work.
Chen et al. treats the mind as a control system and takes a computational approach to
model mental processes (Chen et al., 2001 a). The implemented model of the mind incorporates
a motivational system and an emotion system. These two systems interact so that motivations
affect the current emotional state and so that emotions affect the motivational state.
The motivation system evaluates current motivations, activates the motivation that is
most appropriate given the situation, chooses the active goal, and feeds goals to the emotion
system. It relies on a static hierarchy of motivations that is subsumed by a dynamic component.
11

The emotion system is tasked with generating affective responses to the environment
with respect to the agent’s goals and motivations. The emotion generated by the system
influences goal generation, and effects the selection of action.
In Gratch and Marsella (2001), the problem of modeling emotive influence is examined
in two complimentary ways, one developed by Gratch and one developed by Marsella. Gratch's
Emile system focuses on how the agent's perception of the environment impacts its emotional
state, while Marsella's IPD system focuses on the influences of emotion, cognition, and behavior
have on each other (Gratch and Marsella, 2001).
Gratch's approach suggests that by maintaining an explicit plan, complex and powerful
emotions such as anger, hope, fear, and anticipation are possible. This method also offers
dynamic adaptation of emotions by enabling appraisals of the current state. It does not, however,
address how this dynamic emotive state affects the agent's behavior (Gratch and Marsella, 2001).
Marsella's work organizes behaviors into five distinct focus modes. These modes are
specific lexicons of behavior that are tightly coupled with emotional states. In fact, transition
between modes is governed by the current emotional state of the agent. These focus modes are
designed to heighten the ability of the agent to convey intentionality (Gratch and Marsella,
2001).
When both Gratch's and Marsella's work are combined, the result is distinct behavioral
focus modes that change due to a dynamic emotional state based on the appraisal of the current
environment and the agent's plan. This is extended to allow behavior to influence the cognition
of the agent. The focus mode is tied to a domain specific stimuli ranking mechanism and filter
set that govern the agent's sensitivity to external influences (Gratch and Marsella, 2001).
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In El Nasir et al. (1999), the generation of emotions is tied closely to the process of
learning. It is argued that the process of event prediction, a direct precursor of emotion
generation in this model, is impacted by information learned about specific events and about
specific actions of users. Learning about pleasing and displeasing actions alters the internal
model of the user, a precursor of behavior selection. Finally, Pavlovian stimulus-response
conditioning may directly modify event-emotion association, also a precursor of emotion
generation (El Nasir et al., 1999).
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth (1998) constructed a synthetic actor endowed with a model of
personality based on social learning theory. Rousseau and Hayes-Roth implemented this model
by distinguishing between personality traits, mood, and emotion. Although they state that
“personality is a persistent characteristic that changes little and slowly, if at all, over time”,
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth point out that the strength of the “social-psychology model” of
personality is that it allows the actors’ personality traits to change as a result of learning from
each interaction (Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998). Each general behavior is specified in
advance, allowing for conditions on personality traits to be tested. The implementation of mood
is similar, as is the implementation of emotion (called attitude by Rousseau and Hayes-Roth)
however no provisions are made in the mood or emotional model for the influence of personality.
A suite of actions that have personality traits attached to them as conditionals further complicates
the model. Rousseau and Hayes-Roth’s model does not allow for planning, confining the actor
to spur of the moment improvisation (Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998).
In Kshirsagar (2002), the focus of the work is the personification of virtual humans. That
is to say, the focus is the endowment of virtual humans with personality. He identifies four types
of personification: physical, expressional, logical, and emotional. Physical personification is
13

defined as designing the way the virtual human looks, while expressional personification is
defined as how the virtual human uses gesture and facial expression to express himself. Logical
personification is the design of how the virtual human processes input, reasons, and creates
output. Emotional personification is defined as designing the “mind” that controls the evolution
of emotions over time (Kshirsagar, 2002).
Kshirsagar fulfills emotional personification by implementing a multilayer personality
model for synthetic characters in which the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality, a model of
mood, and an emotional model that is loosely based on the Ortony, Clore, and Collins (OCC)
model are used. Kshirsagar uses a layered approach similar to Rousseau and Hayes-Roth (1998),
claiming that personality is practically immutable over time, that while mood is a prolonged state
of mind it can change over time, and that emotions are transitory. Kshirsagar also relates the
three layers with personality being the highest, most deliberative layer, mood being affected via
personality and emotion and emotional state being instantaneous and affected by mood
(Kshirsagar, 2002).
Kshirsagar fulfills logical personification by the alteration of A.L.I.C.E., a classificationbased chatbot. A.L.I.C.E is based on a statically-defined pattern-response system that matches
natural language statements to syntax patterns stored in memory and mechanically responds
(A.L.I.C.E., 2004). This pattern-response system is particularly brittle in the face of uncertainty
and responds to these situations by matching more general statements (e.g. if no entry for “I want
a piece of cake” exists, but there is an entry for “I want *”, the system responds with the defined
output for “I want *”). Kshirsagar’s modifications to the system include adding a Bayesian
weight to the input matching and specifying emotional content to respond with. It is unclear how
deeply in the pattern tree these emotional cases were implemented, and it could be particularly
14

problematic if a general statement such as “I want *” has an attached emotional context since “I
want a piece of cake” and “I want to laugh until my sides hurt” have completely different
emotional connotations. Also, while this model relies on tracking the personality, mood, and
emotion of the synthetic character, what is actually expressed is the personality and emotional
preferences of the designer (Kshirsagar, 2002).
Each of the methods presented above is incomplete in some respect, and while the
methods are foundational, even if the methods were complete, they would not be sufficient to
complete the proposed work. Chen et al.'s model offers real time, or slightly delayed, motivation
and emotion synthesis which in turn influence behavior, however, it seems to be firmly locked in
the present, excluding such emotions as anticipation or dread. Gratch and Marsella adequately
address this shortcoming, but fail to adequately address how behavior impacts emotions and does
not adequately allow for the agent to learn from past emotional experiences. El Nasir et al.'s
method seems well suited to allow the past to influence of emotional state, but does not seem to
address the correlation of emotion and intellect. These models only address the inclusion of an
artificial emotive state in planning and goal fulfillment. All of the models appear to have been
developed in absence of relevant psychological theories. In short, the methods proposed by these
studies are only part of the equation.
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth’s method allows for the influence of personality, mood, and
emotion on the actions of the synthetic character, but does not allow their influence on each
other. Kshirsagar’s model is the most complete, although the implementation is very limited and
does not allow for the expression of the personality and emotional model by the character. Both
of these systems are also unsuitable for displaying lexical and creative intentionality as
implemented.
15

Intentionality In Synthetic Characters
Humans find interaction with synthetic characters to be the most synergistic when they
feel an affinity with the character's mental state based on the observable behavior of the
character. Therefore, for the purposes of the present work, let intentionality in synthetic
characters be defined as “the perceived link between a character's actions and its beliefs and
desires.” However, it is equally engaging to interact with characters for which we feel no
affinity with the character's mental state, such as villains in a work of fiction, although we must
still glimpse the motivations behind the behaviors. The important factor that must be conveyed
via intentionality is the believable emotional expression and other social aspects of the character
derived from the situation (Paiva et al., 2001; Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998).
Characters in traditional media fulfill a dramatic role, such as that of a hero, or that of a
villain. Roles are defined as a generalized class of individuals for which prototypical behaviors,
relationships and interactions are known both to the actors and the audience (Hayes-Roth, 1997).
Creating believable, yet synthetic, emotional expression is hinged upon working within the
established character role and making role appropriate responses to the user's attempts to change
the interaction. In this case, the ‘role’ is defined by the defined personality, i.e., the emotional
and social aspects that lend believability to the performance of the synthetic character (Rousseau
and Hayes-Roth, 1998). These dramatic roles help humans to construct a mental model by
conveying prototypical behaviors, schema (McKeown, 1985), scripts (Shank and Abelman,
1977), and the like.
In order to construct a mental model of a synthetic character's mental state, one must feel
he gains insight into the motivations and thought processes of the character based on visual
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communication, linguistic communication, or a combination of the two. In this case, visual
communication refers to actions, quality of action, timing of action, form-appropriate gesture,
expression, and other visual cues of mental state appropriate to the character (Yoon et al., 2000).
Linguistic communication may be textual or auditory, although auditory implementations must
also address intonation and tempo.
Traditionally, humans communicate through language, gesture, gaze, expression and
touch. Gestures that do not contain qualitative aspects of movement do not convey motivation
and personality (Badler et al., 2000). Communicative gestures have been cataloged into five
general types:
1. Iconics – representative of some feature of the subject, such as its shape or orientation.
2. Metaphorics – representative of abstract features of the subject, such as its use or
exchange.
3. Deictics -- used to indicate some spatial point.
4. Beats -- hand movements that accent spoken words and speaker turn-taking.
5. Emblems -- stereotypical patterns with well understood semantics. (Badler et al., 2000)
As mentioned above, communication between humans may be either lexical or creative
in nature (Poggi, 2001). A lexical system is one that relies on a lexicon of syntax-semantics
pairs, while a creative system is one that relies on a set of encoded rules to create new syntax for
a given meaning or to decipher a meaning from a given syntax. Any lexical system and any
creative system developed for a synthetic character must operate within the scope of the
established role of the character and must be appropriate within the scope of the situation.
Equipping a synthetic character with lexical verbal skills to implement intentionality is
necessary, but clearly not sufficient. A.L.I.C.E. is a text-based chatbot system that operates
17

exclusively from the realm of lexical communication, based on the erroneous belief that human
communication is the result of only pattern-response behavioral learning (A.L.I.C.E., 2004).
Using A.L.I.C.E. can be entertaining, and engaging due to the personality of the “bot master”
entering the pattern-response pairs into the lexicon, but the system breaks down in the face of
uncertainty, often replying with nonsensical phrases, broken sentences, repeated sentences, or
general responses such as “I didn’t get that. Try being more specific or less specific.”
(A.L.I.C.E., 2004). Lexical-only systems do not fully meet the criteria of adaptability.
Endowing a synthetic character with the means of conveying lexical and creative
intentionality allows the synthetic character to reliably express its mental state, even when faced
with concepts that are outside its lexicon. While the combination of gesture, gaze, and verbal
language is the most human-like method of face-to-face communication, any single form is
sufficient to convey intentionality, albeit with less precision and a greater possibility of
misunderstandings. If the creative system is expanded to allow the character to transform lexical
responses to match its mood, emotional state, or personality factors, and provided that the mood,
emotion, and personality models are implemented with strict attention to psychological research,
the synthetic character will be able to reliably express its mental state in a believable and
consistent manner.

Personality And Personality Dynamics In Synthetic Characters
The author feels strongly that in order to model human personality with enough accuracy
that humans feel affinity with the mental state of the synthetic character; one must base the
model on an accurate representations and relevant theories of personality. Additionally, one
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must give sufficient thought to personality dynamics, that is, “the mechanism by which
personality is expressed, often focusing on the motivations that direct behavior” (Cloninger,
2004). Personality dynamics is tightly coupled with the author’s definition of intentionality.
Individuals may be identified by assessing and quantifying their cognitive traits and, since
experimental analysis shows a systemic and complex relationship between non-cognitive traits
and cognitive performance (Revelle, 1995), by identifying their personality in accordance with
an established personality theory. Personality theories are mainly concerned with the structure of
the human mind, or psyche, which subsumes the explanation of how individual psychological
processes are organized and made coherent.
The author submits that in order to create a synthetic personality there are seven
necessary and sufficient conditions:
1. a method of description of the uniqueness or individual characteristics that set the
synthetic personality apart from similar creations
2. a descriptive characterization of the behavior of the construct
3. a predicative characterization of the behavior of the creation
4. the subjective sense of internal consistency or the ‘memory of identity’ of the synthetic
personality
5. the methods of motivation, that is free-will vs. deterministic behavior
6. the method of lasting change to the personality
7. the method for growth
Implied by these conditions is the concept of identification, that is, the ability of others to
guess the personality type given to the character. Therefore, the personality dynamics of the

19

character must also be identifiable, i.e., the emotive state, the mood, and the cognitive state of the
character.
Carolus Linneaus said: “All real knowledge that we possess depends on the methods by
which we distinguish the similar from the dissimilar” (Fujita, 2004). Thus, the question presents
itself: “Which personality theory is best suited for the creation of synthetic personality?” We
must not use just any personality theory when creating synthetic personalities, but the type of
theory that is best suited for the work. Considerable thought must be given to the questions of
design and the intent of the construct, and comparisons should be made between the theory and
the cognitive model to be implemented as well.
Over the years, several schools of personality theory have developed, including:
psychodynamic theories espoused by Freud, Jung, Adler, Eriksson, and others; humanistic
theories like those associated with Rogers, Maslow, and others; behavioral theories such as those
identified by Skinner, Staats, and others; and finally, trait or taxonomic theories hypothesized by
Allport, Catell, McRae and Costa, and others. These approaches vary widely in almost every
detail, and all offer valid and important insights into the human condition.
When the continuum of personality theories is analyzed using the criteria of the scientific
method versus humanism, two important approach-based partitions emerge, namely nomotheticbased theories versus idiographic-based theories (Cloninger, 2004). The nomothetic approach
studies groups of individuals, and allow us to compare one person with another. The idiographic
approach studies individuals without making systematic comparisons to others. Both approaches
have strengths and weaknesses and truly understanding human personality will likely require
contributions from both approaches (Cloninger, 2004), but for the purposes of the present work,
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the nomothetic approach is the best suited as feeling affinity for the mental state of another
requires a comparison to one’s own mental state as a reference.
Freud’s Psychodynamic theory proposes that behavior is the result of psychological
forces according to the assumption of psychic determinism. Personality is described in terms of
the “id”, a structure that unconsciously seeks the immediate fulfillment of biological drives, the
“ego”, a structure that adapts to reality through the application of defense mechanisms in the face
of conflict, and the “superego”, a structure that produces guilt and an ego ideal in response to
societal restrictions. Psychodynamic theory emphasizes the role of the unconscious and
psychosexual development of personality (Cloninger, 2004).
Jung proposes that “the unconsciousness contains broad psychic energy, rather than
simply sexual energy” and that consciousness and unconsciousness exist in a relationship of
compensation (Cloninger, 2004). In fact, Jung proposes that through the process of
“individuation”, unconscious aspects of personality are developed and integrated with the
consciousness into the mature self. Based on the dimension of introversion and Extroversion,
Jungian personality theory espouses eight psychetypes, such as thinking-feeling, and sensingintuition (Cloninger, 2004).
Adler emphasized conscious striving and goal driven behavior, as well as the creative
self. Though Adler thought of each person as unique, his theory listed three types of “mistaken
styles of life”, such as the getting type, the ruling type, and the avoiding type. He theorized that
the cause of these unhealthy styles rested firmly with the style of parenting, i.e., pampering or
neglectful. Emphasis is placed on being socially useful and social interest (Cloninger, 2004).
Eriksson proposed an eight-stage theory of psychosocial development. These stages
involve culturally relevant crisis resolution for each individual. Culture is the major influence on
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development and conversely, individuals influence culture through the way they develop at each
stage. Eriksson’s theory is well supported by research and has been shown to be cross-cultural
(Cloninger, 2004)
With respect to the present work, the emphasis on psychosexual development and
unconscious processes make Freud’s theory unsuitable. Jungian personality theory is also
rejected, due to its reliance on individuation, and the emphasis on unconscious processes.
Adler’s theory relies too much on parental influence to be a viable model for a synthetic
character. Eriksson’s theory is also unsuitable since it relies on a mutually influential
relationship between the individual and his culture. All of these theories are highly
deterministic. Therefore, psychodynamic theories of personality will not be used in the present
work.
Rogers proposed a theory of personality based on the humanistic viewpoint in which the
individual actively seeks higher development, motivated by the “actualizing tendency” as
opposed to development via passive determination by external or unconscious forces. Rogerian
theory was specified so that it could be empirically verified, but focused more on personality
change than on the development or structure of personality. Rogers did not offer a scheme for
understanding personality differences (Cloninger, 2004).
Maslow proposed a theory of personality that was less deterministic and more focused on
human values. Maslow’s Need Hierarchy identifies five levels of development ranging from
physical to emotional to psychological. Individuals are motivated by deficiencies through the
first four levels and once they become “self-actualized” the source of motivation switches to
“being motivation”, i.e., the need to fulfill their potential. The theory emphasizes immediate
experience as an aspect of psychological health (Cloninger, 2004)
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The lack of a scheme for differentiating personality makes Roger’s theory unsuitable for
the present work. The subjective nature of Maslow’s theory causes it to be abandoned. Also,
given that humanistic theories are idiographic approaches (Cloninger, 2004), they will not be
suitable models for the current work.
B.F. Skinner proposed a theory of individual behavior in terms of only observable,
environmental determinants. Internal characteristics or traits were ignored. Less a personality
theory, than an alternate theory to explain human behavior, Skinner’s theory of “operant
conditioning” proposes that behaviors are acquired as a result of reinforcement and extinguished
as a result of punishment (Cloninger, 2004).
Staats proposed a theory of psychological behaviorism that attempts to address some of
the inadequacies of Skinner’s work. He proposes that personality is composed of three
categories of “basic behavioral repertoires” (learned behaviors that have broad effects on
personality and are the basis for later learning), namely: the emotional-motivational repertoire,
the language-cognitive repertoire, and the sensory-motor repertoire. Psychological behaviorism
describes personality as learned, in which effective learning produces psychological adjustment
and ineffective learning produces maladjustment (Cloninger, 2004).
Skinner’s theory is criticized as being overly deterministic and reductionist (Cloninger,
2004) and fails to address the issue of human individuality, which is at the center of the proposed
work, and is thus unsuitable. Conversely, Staats’ psychological behaviorism theory seems to fit
well with the concept of lexical intentionality, as it seems to describe a non-deterministic lexicon
of pattern-response pairs that are conveniently similar to the needs of a synthetic character and
that can be learned and extinguished. Unfortunately, although it does embrace the idea of
identification of individual through psychological testing, Staats’ work alone does not seem to be
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sufficient to adequately differentiate an individual, but will be used in the present work to help
fulfill lexical intentionality with regard to personality dynamics.
Allport defines personality as “the dynamic organization within the individual of those
psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment” (Cloninger,
2004) and identifies the atomic unit of personality as the trait. Evidence to support his claim of
personality traits comes from many sources, including language, behavior, studies, etc. Allport
describes three kinds of traits: “Cardinal traits” that have pervasive influence but rare occurrence,
“Central traits” that have broad influence and ubiquitous occurrence, and “Secondary traits” that
influence only a few behaviors (Cloninger, 2004).
Cattell defined personality as “that which permits a prediction of what a person will do in
a given situation” and developed many different types of personality tests and factor analyses
seeking the underlying source traits that determine personality. He distinguished several types of
traits including: dynamic, temperamental, and ability, and arrived at five fundamental traits
through a second-order factor analysis of the results of his personality testing (Cloninger, 2004).
With regard to synthetic characters, any of the trait-based taxonomic theories fit well.
First, consider that the purpose of a taxonomy is to describe the universe of phenomena to be
explained or studied (Fujita, 2004). Fujita (2004) goes on to say: “A good taxonomy will point
researchers in fruitful directions in their research and will allow a standard vocabulary by which
their research results may be communicated and related with each other.” Although synthetic
personalities are proposed by the author primarily as a method of increasing user immersion and
engagement, psychologists should be able to evaluate a synthetic personality based on relevant
personality theory and find some parallels to human behavior. Additionally, a character that is
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built from sound psychological principles could be more effectively used in psychological
research and simulations.
There are several personality taxonomies to choose from, including Allport’s theory, and
Cattell’s five trait theory, but due to the amount of existing research on McRae and Costa’s Five
Factor Model (FFM), it is the most likely candidate. The structure of the FFM itself also helps to
distinguish the taxonomy as the appropriate choice, given the high degree of coupling between
the model and agent-based reasoning, a common architecture for implementing synthetic
characters.
The FFM breaks personality into five continua:
1. Neuroticism
2. Extroversion
3. Openness
4. Agreeableness
5. Conscientiousness (Costa and Widiger, 2002)
These continua help to identify personality by locating the individual in a normal, an
abnormally high or an abnormally low range (Clark et al., 2002). This feature directly relates to
numbers one, two, three, and four of the seven necessary and sufficient conditions for synthetic
personality as defined by the author above. Specifically, a large amount of psychological
research has shown that personality classification based on the FFM can be predictive in terms of
responses from individuals (Costa and Widiger, 2002). Also, the very fact that the FFM is used
to classify individuals as a specific personality type helps to mark one individual from the next.
Finally, the FFM is being used as a characterization of behavior in that it is gaining acceptance as
a diagnostic tool for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) (Clark et al., 2002), which
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while not directly relevant to the planned work, only emphasizes the merit of using synthetic
personalities in psychological research. Further, according to Costa and Widiger (2002),
distinguishing normal and abnormal psychology makes no sense from a trait-based approach,
and therefore the diagnoses listed in the DSM may be used as additional identifiers for individual
characters.
Neuroticism is defined as “a chronic level of emotional adjustment and instability.” High
measures of Neuroticism identify subjects who are prone to psychological distress. These
individuals commonly display a “negative affect, unrealistic ideas, excessive cravings, difficulty
tolerating frustration caused by not acting on their cravings, and a maladaptive coping response”
(Costa and Widiger, 2002).
Extroversion is “representative of the quantity and intensity of preferred interpersonal
interactions, activity level, need for stimulation, and capacity for joy.” A person measuring high
on the Extroversion scale is likely to be “sociable, active, talkative, person-oriented, fun-loving,
and optimistic”. Conversely, a person measuring low on the Extroversion scale is likely to be
“reserved, sober, aloof, independent, and quiet” (Costa and Widiger, 2002).
Openness involves “active seeking and appreciation of experiences for their own sake.”
Open individuals are “curious, imaginative, and willing to entertain novel ideas and
unconventional values.” They experience the whole gamut of emotions more vividly than do
closed (those with low Openness measures) individuals. Closed individuals are often
“conservative, conventional, dogmatic, rigid in their beliefs, set in their ways, and emotionally
unresponsive” (Costa and Widiger, 2002).
Agreeableness is “an interpersonal dimension that refers to the kinds of interactions a
person prefers along the continuum from compassion to antagonism.” Highly agreeable
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individuals are often “soft-hearted, good natured, trusting, helpful, forgiving, and altruistic.”
They tend to be responsive and empathic, and believe most others are cut from the same cloth.
Individuals with a low Agreeableness measure are likely to be “cynical, rude, abrasive,
suspicious, uncooperative, irritable, and can be manipulative, vengeful, and ruthless” (Costa and
Widiger, 2002).
The Conscientiousness domain “assesses the degree of organization, persistence, control,
and motivation in goal directed behavior.” People with a high measure of Conscientiousness
tend to be “organized, reliable, hard working, self-directed, punctual, scrupulous, ambitious, and
persevering.” Low measures of Conscientiousness often indicate “aimless, unreliable, lazy,
careless, lax, negligent, and hedonistic” individuals (Costa and Widiger, 2002).
Taxonomic theorists also address the question of free will versus determinism. Traits are
viewed as individually consistent adaptations to the environment rather than fixed-point
behavioral responses (Clark et al., 2002). In other words, each response that is based on or
influenced by a personality trait is dynamic in nature and can be altered directly by the
environment or the previous actions of the individual. This meets conditions five, six, and seven
as defined above.
The FFM is as good a taxonomy as can be expected until a more coherent physiology of
personality processes is achieved (Fujita, 2004). Further, the FFM is lexical in nature, that is, it
assumes that socially relevant personality characteristics have become encoded in our language
(Fujita, 2004). Also, and perhaps most importantly, if the FFM describes basic personality traits,
they should be trans-cultural (Fujita, 2004). Finally, it is a hierarchical model of the structure of
personality traits (Costa and Widiger, 2002).
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In Kshirsagar (2002), a multilayer personality model is proposed for synthetic characters
in which the Five Factor Personality model, a model of mood, and an emotional model based on
Ekman’s six basic emotions are used. Kshirsagar uses a layered approach, claiming that
personality is practically immutable over time, mood can change over time, but is a prolonged
state of mind, and emotions are transitory. Kshirsagar also relates the three layers with
personality being the highest, most deliberative layer, mood being effectible via both personality
and emotion, and emotional state being instantaneous and affected by mood (Kshirsagar, 2002).
Kshirsagar’s model seems inadequate and overly simplified. Vel’asquez (1997)
differentiates mood and emotion only by level of arousal, rather than length of activation.
Additionally, Gross (2002) differentiates affect across four valence states: stress response,
emotion (such as anger and sadness), emotion episodes (such as tirades and bar-room brawls),
and moods (such as depression and euphoria). That the FFM of personality is tightly coupled
with emotion can hardly be argued, given that the Neuroticism domain is the measure of
emotional stability versus emotional lability, and at least two of the other domains, Extroversion,
Openness, have emotional blandness as a possible outcome of low measures. Finally, with
respect to the FFM itself, personality theorists view traits not as fixed-point behavioral
responses, but as reflecting adaptations to the environment that are consistent with each
individual (Clark et al., 2002) and are therefore not immutable, but dynamic.
Kshirsagar implements a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for each factor of the FFM,
however these BBNs are used only to calculate the present mood of the character given its latest
mood and the normalized values from the personality model (Kshirsagar, 2002). This, however,
seems to clash with the mood research presented above, the emotional models examined, and the
FFM itself. Further, Kshirsagar does not allow for any adaptation, believable or otherwise, of
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the response generated, nor does it allow for the believable expression of the character’s state of
mind, but relies on pre-scripted “emotional responses” that are written by the developer and
associated with some emotional state (Kshirsagar, 2002).
Kshirsagar implements his personality model without regard for the proposed necessary
and sufficient conditions of synthetic personality. Items two, three, six, and seven are not
fulfilled by Kshirsagar’s model. Although the model should provide a descriptive
characterization of the behavior of the character, Kshirsagar’s implementation limits this
characterization to a change in emotional state, since the behavior, as represented by the response
from the character, is pre-scripted by the designer and is therefore descriptive only of the
designer. The same argument applies to predictive characterization. Kshirsagar outlines a
partial method that might be used to allow for growth and lasting personality change, but the
mere exercise in predicting the next mood or emotion is useless unless some evaluative measure
is used to determine the success of the prediction. This evaluative measure could be extended to
allow for growth and lasting personality change if the measure were applied to the weights in the
BBN.
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth’s (1998) “social-psychology model” of personality is based on
trait-based personality theory and social learning theories. Rousseau and Hayes-Roth fail to
identify which trait-based theory is used, stating only: “Unfortunately, there are many theories
proposing various personality traits and none of them are universally accepted” (Rousseau and
Hayes-Roth’s, 1998). Indeed, it is important to note that as Cloninger (2004) points out, “there
is no single paradigm to serve as a theoretical model accepted by the entire field of personality.”
However, Revelle (1995) states that there is a consensus “among most, but not all description
taxonomists” that the FFM is the best trait-based theory. As mentioned earlier, Fujita (2004)
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states that the FFM is as good a taxonomy as can be expected until more coherent physiology of
personality processes can be achieved. Further, many researchers have settled on five basic
personality traits through various lexical criteria (Fujita, 2004; Cloninger, 2004; Kokkonen and
Pulkkinen, 2001).
Rousseau and Hayes-Roth’s (1998) model implements traits on a numeric scale and the
traits are subject to very little change over time. They implement mood and emotion on a similar
scale, but allow for more change at a more rapid pace. Rousseau and Hayes-Roth’s (1998)
model is implemented to support all seven of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
synthetic personality as described above.
Personality in synthetic characters is pointless without the believable expression of
emotions, mood, and individual characteristics, i.e., personality dynamics. As can be seen in the
review of the synthetic personality implementations above, the definitions of emotion and mood
vary widely from implementation to implementation. This may be the result of the vacillation of
psychologists on the subject and the fact that the term emotion is a term that was lifted from
common language with all of its connotations intact (Gross, 2002). Recently, researchers have
returned to the concept of emotion and have postulated prototype conceptions of emotions
(Gross, 2002).
Based on the work of Ekman, Russell, and others, three noteworthy features of
prototypical emotion exist:
1. Emotions arise when an individual evaluates a situation as significant.
2. Emotions are multifaceted, whole body processes that involve changes in the
domains of subjective experience, behavioral expression, and central and
peripheral physiology.
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3. Emotions may be described as either dimensions or categories (Gross, 2002)
By implication of the third feature, definition of mood may be unnecessary. Indeed, if
one adopts the dimensional approach to emotion, relatively broad dimensions that describe
changes in the emotional experience, expression, and physiology are adopted. Emotions are seen
as continuously distributed over a few dimensions, such as positive affect, negative affect,
intensity, pleasantness, etc. This seems to fit with the work of Vel’asquez (1997) and with
Buddhist philosophy (Solomon, 2002).
Conversely, the categorical approach focuses on discrete emotions and differentiates
between emotions. Descartes proposed that six simple and primitive passions exists: wonder,
love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness and went on to say that all other emotions are compositions
of some number of these six or subspecies of them (Solomon, 2002). Other philosophers, such
as Aristotle, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Rousseau, and Smith also espoused some number of “basic
passions” (Solomon, 2002). Ekman (1992) identified six basic emotions (also called affect
programs): joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise. Despite the apparent popularity and
historical precedence of this categorical approach, this idea remains controversial; the dispute is
centered on the concept that a small set of basic emotions exist (Hudlicka, 2002). Indeed, the
point of Solomon’s (2002) paper is to caution against such “cognitive as well as biological
reductionism”, claiming that emotion is a “holistic” experience and that any emphasis on one
aspect or another distorts the subject.
Other theories of emotion exist, such as the social construction view of emotion as
championed by Averill, which argues that emotion is characteristically the result of social
interaction, Oatley’s computational model, and Ortony, Clore, and Collin’s cognitive model of
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emotion (Watts, 1997). The author has avoided a review of “mind-body” theories due to the
focus of the proposed work.
Research examining the link between personality traits and emotions is of particular
pertinence to the proposed work. Plutchik goes so far as to propose that traits are the result of a
combination of emotions and that humans identify the personality of others based on emotional
behavior (Emmons and Deiner, 1986). Similarly, it has been found that traits and emotions can
be represented in the similar circular arrangements based on the dimensional approach, although
the dimensions used in the personality circumplex vary from theorist to theorist, while the
emotion circumplex is generally constructed around the Hedonic Tone and Activation axes
(O’Malley and Gillet, 1984).
O’Malley and Gillet’s (1984) work goes on to show that there is an identifiable,
systematic relation between personality traits and emotions. Indeed, O’Malley and Gillet state:
“...emotions are fairly well determinable from specific traits.” Though O’Malley and Gillet did
not correlate all five traits of the FFM, their research used Neuroticism-Stable and ExtrovertedIntroverted traits and developed roughly the same list of emotions as specified in the discussion
of the FFM above.
Emmons and Deiner (1986) performed a similar study in the context of “ecologically
valid settings, i.e., individuals everyday lives” and report theoretically meaningful relations
between various personality dimensions and specific emotions. The study also supports the
inclusion of Staats’ psychological behaviorism theory with a trait-based model of psychology in
that the researchers found that the experience of certain emotions are not always independent of
context (Emmons and Deiner, 1986).
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As this short review indicates, psychological, philosophical, and social research in
emotion is particularly chaotic, with little in the way of consensus or prevailing theories
supported by empirical research. Gross (2002) speculates that this is the result of emotion
researchers emphasizing differences among approaches and definitions. One concept that each
of these theories share is that emotions have an antecedent and a response. Many theories
emphasize that emotion is governed by an appraisal of the antecedent and that the process of
emotion regulation influences emotion (Gross, 2002). Gross (2002) goes on to state that emotion
regulation is necessary due to the impact of our emotions on a wide range of mental processes.
Emotion regulation includes the concepts of expression of emotion and the subjective experience
of emotion (Kokkonen and Pulkkinen, 2001).
As with emotion, precise definition of mood is elusive. Two approaches are generally
taken in regard to mood and emotion. The first approach is most often used and views mood and
emotion as conceptually equivalent, and therefore interchangeable. The second approach, which
was used in both of the synthetic characters that implemented a personality and emotion model
reviewed above, differentiates mood and emotion mostly by specification and duration.
Emotions are generally considered to be brief, event driven, object related, and relatively intense.
Emotions are also associated with distinct expressions and influence action. Mood is generally
considered broader and longer acting, and of lower intensity. Mood is also assumed to influence
cognition rather than action (Kokkonen and Pulkkinen, 2001).
The author finds both of these definitions insufficient. First, if we assume that mood and
emotion are conceptually equal, they should not be distinguishable from one another. If that is
true, then it must not be possible to be in negative mood and feel happiness, or in a positive
mood and feel any negative axis emotion, but experience with the human condition rapidly
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disproves this argument in the author’s opinion. Therefore, the first approach to differentiating
mood and emotion must be flawed. Second, if the second method is correct, there can’t be a
single example that fits both categories. By counter-example, grief can be catastrophic in terms
of intensity and duration. It can influence action, and cognition. It can also be associated with
distinct expressions, and is event driven. It may be object related (such as the grief felt at the
loss of a loved one) or may not be object related (for example, the grief derived from failing an
important life goal, such as completing a dissertation). Grief must be both an emotion and a
mood, and therefore, the second definition listed above is also flawed.
For the purposes of the present work, let mood be defined as meta-emotional experiences
and let emotion be defined as the class of cognates (atomic units of cognition) that correspond to
distinct feelings such as joy, anger, etc. Further, the author proposes that mood acts as a partition
on the class of emotions, in other words, segregates emotions into like groups. For instance,
positive and negative affect segregate the class of human emotions into two distinct groups, with
emotions like joy, love, pleasure, delight, and serenity in one equivalence class and emotions like
anger, hatred, disgust, and lethargy in the other. Thus, it can be argued that emotional
experience is classified hierarchically, a position supported by the theories and research of
Deiner, Smith, and Fujita; Russell and Feldman Barrett; and Watson and Clark (Gross, 2002).
Both mood and emotion must have discrete state models in a synthetic character and both
must be able to influence the other equally. For example, the author can identify a positive mood
and still be experiencing a negative axis emotion. If the negative axis emotion continues to be
reinforced, the author’s mood may gradually become negative, while a negative emotion that is
not reinforced may fade in the face of the positive mood. It certainly can be argued that
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numerous reasons for this exist and the author makes no claims that this anecdotal example is
proof of any theory.
In summary, to implement personality and personality dynamics in synthetic characters,
it is necessary to identify the appropriate model of personality, identify a suitable theory of
emotion, identify a suitable theory of mood, and allow all three of these models to influence one
another equally. Further, the synthetic character’s personality must be identifiable based on the
expression of its emotion and mood. Additionally, these three models must integrate the model
of cognition used in the character.

Cognition In Synthetic Characters
What is cognition? This is a difficult question to answer since the processes under study
are internal and are often studied using retrospective reports which may not be trustworthy
(Hurlburt et al., 2002). Newell and Simon argue that the human capacity of thought, emotion,
communication, and behavior arise from our capacity to process symbols (Green et al., 1996).
Searle challenged the idea with his “Chinese room argument”, and attempted to illustrate that
thinking can’t be limited to symbol manipulation alone (Green et al., 1996). Taking this
argument a step farther, Harnad proposes that certain basic symbols are linked to representations
of objects, and thus cognition is best modeled using a symbolic-connectionist approach (Green et
al., 1996). Harnad’s method breaks down in the face of certain linguistic concepts that have no
real-world objects, such as permission or obligation.
Whether Newell and Simon are correct or Searle is correct, is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. The author is concerned with the believable expression of mental state, and the
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question “Is modeling cognition necessary to implement lexical and creative intentionality?”
presents itself. This question can be restated as: “Is there a link between cognition and
behavior?”
The immediate, intuitive answer is in the affirmative. The link between cognition and
behavior is one of the tenets of cognitive psychology (Ashcraft, 1998; Hurlburt et al., 2002), and
this link was verified empirically by Hurlburt et al. (2002). Therefore, to implement
intentionality, synthetic characters must implement some model of cognition, as well as a model
of personality, emotion, and mood.
Previously, cognition was defined as “the collection of mental processes and activities
used in perceiving, learning, remembering, thinking, and understanding, and the act of using
those processes” (Ashcraft, 1998). To put it another way, cognition refers to all of the human
mental processes, “from perception and recognition up through reasoning and inference”
(Ashcraft, 1998). In synthetic characters, only a subset of these processes may be necessary.
Implementing lexical and creative intentionality in synthetic characters requires a subset
of cognitive processes that is unique from synthetic characters that only implement lexical
intentionality or no intentionality. Loosely based on Palinscar and Brown’s model of reading
comprehension (Hillerbrand, 1989), the author submits that creative intent implies seven explicit
cognitive abilities, namely:
1. recognition of and appropriate response generation for user input in an imperfect
and incomplete problem domain
2. such processing of user input as required for internal consistency and other
cognitive processes outlined here
3. activation of knowledge in memory
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4. domain-appropriate reasoning
5. evaluation of cognitive and emotion operations, and generative responses for
accuracy and appropriateness
6. planning, adaptation, anticipation
7. encoding new knowledge into memory.
Recognition of user input and generation of an appropriate response may sometimes be
fulfilled with no reasoning required. Similar to the computer program alluded to in Searle’s
Chinese room argument, the A.L.I.C.E. chat bot relies on the pattern-response process to mimic
conversation, and therefore, no thinking or understanding occurs (A.L.I.C.E., 2004).

While

many researchers dispute the validity of this process, Ashcraft (1998) states that some human
behaviors support this approach, at least those linked with highly over-learned and practiced
cognitive processes. These types of processes are said to be “automatic.” It can be argued that
the antecedents of these cognitive processes have been stored with the appropriate response in a
lexicon similar to the basic behavioral repertoires proposed by Staats (Cloninger, 2004). These
automatic processes no longer appear to involve actual processing beyond an appraisal of the
antecedent and a retrieval of the response, or the processing occurs at such a blindingly fast
speed that it is appropriate to model them in an appraisal-retrieval system.
For example, when solving simple multiplication problems (i.e., 2 x 3), it takes the
average college student 700-thousandths of a second to respond with the correct answer, while
other single digit problems that are perceived as harder (i.e., 6 x 9) take up to a second
(Ashcraft, 1998). Ashcraft (1998) estimates that the process of encoding a simple stimulus and
responding to it takes approximately 250-thousandths of a second (a duration that is very close to
the base response time), which leaves very little time to perform the multiplication itself.
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Ashcraft (1998) argues that the retrieval of solutions to these over-learned and practiced
problems occurs without conscience thought, and may be simply long-term memory access, or
performing the calculation in some optimized neural circuit.
A lexicon of automatic cognitive processes does not paint a complete picture of
cognition, however, nor does it allow a synthetic character to recognize and respond to all forms
of input in an incomplete problem domain. There are many cognitive processes that are not
automatic, in fact they are quite slow and deliberate (Ashcraft, 1998). Although certain
inferences (such as the answer to the question “Does fire burn?”) can become automatic, many
others (such as the answer to the question “Did Zeno choose to live by the Four Cardinal Virtues:
Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Decorum?”) do not become automatic due to their relative rarity
or complexity. Therefore, in addition to an appraisal-response model, synthetic characters
implementing creative intentionality must also model these deliberate, conscious cognitions that
occur in the face of unfamiliar problems.
Though there are many different theories about human problem solving, including Gestalt
theory (Ashcraft, 1998), solving problems by insight (Ashcraft, 1998), analogical problem
solving (Green et al., 1996; Ashcraft, 1998), the multi-constraint theory (Ashcraft, 1998), and the
expert model (Green et al.,1998), Ashcraft (1998) identifies four general characteristics of
problem solving:
1. goal directedness
2. a step-wise solution
3. cognitive operations
4. sub-goal decomposition.

38

The Gestalt theory relies on two basic principles: (a) humans perceive “wholes” or
patterns rather than individual parts, and (b) the whole is different from, or greater than the sum
of its individual parts. In his work with animals, Kohler generalized these principles to say that
relations among stimuli are perceived rather than individual elements of the stimuli. Kohler
called this sudden perception of relations “insight.” Additionally, two specific difficulties in
Gestalt problem solving were made by the study of humans: the tendency to use objects in
ordinary rather than creative ways during problem solving, called functional fixedness, and the
tendency to try to solve new problems with old strategies rather than adapting them to the new
situation called negative set, or set effects (Ashcraft, 1998).
Insight can be defined as “a deep, useful understanding of the nature of something”
(Ashcraft, 1998) and often occurs suddenly. Sternberg attributes the sudden nature of insight to
the novel interpretation of the problem or the application of a novel approach. It may be just as
valid, however, to think of insight in terms of overcoming functional fixedness, negative set, or
examining the problem from a different perspective. Wickeldon states that insight sometimes
means that a critical inference that leads to the solution has been drawn (Ashcraft, 1998).
Analogy is the “relationship between two similar situations, problems, or concepts”
(Ashcraft, 1998). Often, analogical problem solving is used to solve problems for which there is
inadequate knowledge (Green et al., 1996). For example, one might think of network
connections as pipes of water, or electricity moving through wires as crowds of people moving
through passageways. For an analogy to be useful, the two problems must be put into some kind
of relationship so that the similarities or differences can be seen (Ashcraft, 1998). Gick and
Holyoak performed analogical problem solving research on humans and discovered that 20% of
their subjects were able to spontaneously notice and use an analogy for their problem, but once
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they were prompted to use it 92% of their subjects were quite good at mapping the analogy to the
new problem (Green et al. 1996; Ashcraft, 1998). Green et al. (1996) notes that this difference
between noticing analogies and mapping known analogies suggests that individuals may not be
able to solve certain problems due to the inability to access suitable analogies.
The multi-constraint theory is an overall theory of analogical problem solving based on
such research as Gick and Holyoak’s. Proposed by Holyoak and Thagard, the theory predicts
how humans use analogies in problem solving and what factors govern the analogies that humans
construct. The theory states that the use or development of analogies is constrained by three
factors: problem similarity (i.e., a reasonable degree of similarity between the source domain and
the target domain), problem structure (i.e., the one-to-one mappings between the source and
target domains), and the purpose of the analogy (Ashcraft, 1998).
The expertise model, proposed by Newell and Simon, describes problem solving as a
state space search through a problem domain. In this view, a mental model is a state within the
problem domain and operations on the mental model are equivalent to traversing the space.
Problems are viewed as a goal and a set of sub-goals. The process of transforming an initial state
into a goal state can be viewed as a set of production rules, or productions. Productions are
simply logical implications, most commonly expressed as IF <predicate> THEN <response>,
where the <predicate> is the local goal and any preconditions and the response is the operation
that transforms the state (Green et al., 1996).
Humans who are experts in a particular problem domain are able to reduce computational
complexity of problems in that domain by manipulating incoming information into recognizable
patterns. Expert knowledge is represented by organized patterns or “schemas” in memory.
These schemas contain knowledge about specific problems, situations, and relevant knowledge
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about the expert’s skills that could be applied to the problem. Experts are able to make broad
inferences, unify seemingly disparate problems by recognizing underlying features, and make
“qualitatively more sophisticated, critical judgments.” Experts also have metacognitive abilities,
that is, cognitive abilities that are applied to the expert’s cognitions. Metacognitive abilities
include the ability to evaluate reasoning, plan, monitor processes, etc. (Hillerbrand, 1989)
Gestalt theory is impractical to implement in synthetic characters as it seems to rely on
high level cognitive processes, such as the interpretation of patterns and the identification of
complex relationships. The insight model could be used in a synthetic character, provided that
Wickeldon’s definition of insight is used. This definition, however, seems to restrict insight to a
natural outcome of the model of expert problem solving. The expert model can certainly be
implemented, indeed, Gonzalez (2002) claims that the problem of creating a computational
expert system is a solved one. Expertise is a possible solution to the deliberate cognition
problem. The analogical problem solving method and constraint theory can both be
implemented in synthetic characters and either method also presents a possible solution to the
problem.
Newell and Simon proposed the first computational model for problem, named the
General Problem Solver (GPS), that was designed to implement the most significant problem
solving heuristic called “means-ends analysis” (Ashcraft, 1998) and that relies on production
rules to transform one problem state into another. In means-ends analysis, the current state is
compared to the stated goal to detect differences between the two. Once the differences are
identified, an operator that reduces the difference is searched for. Failure to find an operator
capable of being applied to the current state initiates a process of setting up a sub-problem that
would allow transition to a state that the operator could be applied to. Means-ends analysis can
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then be applied recursively to reduce all differences that can be identified, thus allowing the goal
state to be reached. GPS was not limited to solving problems in a specific domain; it was able to
solve any problems for which means-ends analysis was appropriate. While it was a very good
simulation of human problem solving, there were cases in which the modeling was low fidelity,
specifically for problems in which the application of means-ends analysis was questionable
(Ashcraft, 1998; Luger and Stubblefield, 1993; Rich and Knight, 1991).
Anderson proposed another general model called ACT* (adaptive control of thought)
which covers the entire array of cognitive processes, but can also be used as a problem solving
model. ACT* incorporates three major components: declarative memory, production memory,
and working memory. Declarative memory is a memory network that is accessed by means of
“spreading activation”. Spreading activation is the process of retrieving concepts based on
activation of the concept by reference, and the spreading of this activation to like nodes in the
semantic network. The strength of the activation weakens with distance from the original
concept and decays over time. Production memory is the stored collection of IF-THEN rules that
run the system. The process of matching input to the conditional part of the production rule
occurs in working memory. Working memory is the part of the system that “keeps track” of the
current state and makes responses to the outside world. ACT* assumes a means-ends approach
to problem solving and is supported by empirical testing in human subjects (Ashcraft, 1998).
SOAR attempts to model human cognition by extending the production rule architecture
(Luger and Stubblefield, 1993) and is based on a set of specific, cognitively motivated
hypotheses about the nature of human problem solving (Rich and Knight, 1991). In SOAR,
problems are solved by defining and searching a problem space (Luger and Stubblefield, 1993).
In the SOAR architecture, long-term memory is stored as a set of productions, and short-term
42

memory is a perception affected buffer that stores facts deduced by rules in long term memory
(Rich and Knight, 1991). All problem solving in the model occurs as a state space traversal and
all results are remembered for future reference (Rich and Knight, 1991). It is important to note
that SOAR treats conflict resolution as a problem in its own right and sets up two problem spaces
for each problem: a problem space that maps to the problem at hand, and a problem space design
to solve the problem of choosing which productions to run from the first space (Rich and Knight,
1991).
Cognition functions in the domain of mental representation. Thus, in order to produce a
synthetic character that appears to cogitate, a model of cognition must be adopted that not only
includes the necessary appraisal-retrieval and creative problem-solving systems, but also
contains a method of constructing, updating, and accessing a mental representation of the
character’s world space and the ability to reason about the world. The essential feature of these
models is that they symbolize a discrete state of affairs, in other words, a description of the world
from the perspective of the character at any given time. Indeed, Craik proposed that the central
function of human thought was to create such models of reality (Green et al., 1996).
How accurate do these mental representations need to be? Imagine a world in which a
complete understanding of every component in a television, the electrical connections to the
power plant, and the method of power generation were necessary to turn on the television.
Fortunately, for laymen such depth of knowledge is unnecessary. In fact, human mental models
are often merely approximations of the world, or are incomplete or incorrect, but can be highly
detailed when necessary (Green et al., 1996). Green et al. (1996) goes on to say that our models
are only as specific as they need to be for the purposes at hand. Therefore, the world model of a
synthetic character is not required to be complex, complete, or even correct. It merely has to
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exist in sufficient detail to allow the character to make decisions, to predict possible outcomes of
its behavior, and to plan.
Decision making in synthetic characters must result in believable actions, occur in realtime, and function in the face of an incomplete problem domain (Kille and Warwick, 2001; Yoon
et al., 2000). Klein (1997) proposed a model of naturalistic decision making (NDM), the
recognition primed decision (RPD) model, that attempts to explain how humans make decisions
“under conditions of time pressure, ambiguous information, poorly defined goals, and changing
conditions.” The RPD model does not address the influence of teams or organizational
constraints, but those issues do not apply to the proposed work. The model, indeed, NDM itself,
shows a high degree of coupling with the concepts of automatic and deliberate cognitions,
outlining three levels of action selection, Simple Match, Diagnose the Situation, and Evaluate a
Course of Action (Klein, 1997).
In the RPD Simple Match procedure, when the presenting situation is perceived as
typical, or recognized as an analog, this recognition produces four by-products: expectancies,
relevant clues, plausible goals, and typical actions. Finally, a course of action is implemented
(Klein, 1997).
In the RPD Diagnose the Situation method, the presenting situation is examined to
determine if it is prototypical, and if it is recognized as such, the same four by-products are
produced and a course of action is implemented. However, if the situation is not recognized as
prototypical or there are anomalies noted during matching with the prototype, diagnosis occurs
(Klein, 1997).
In the Evaluate a Course of Action method of RPD, when the presenting situation is
perceived as typical, or recognized as an analog, this recognition produces four by-products:
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expectancies, relevant clues, plausible goals, and some number of actions. The actions are
evaluated using mental simulation based on the criteria: “Will it work?” If the evaluation is
successful, the action is selected. If the action will work with modification, it is modified and reevaluated. If the action is unsuitable, the next action is evaluated, or if no actions are left the
situation is examined and a new prototype is searched for (Klein, 1997).
Reasoning, problem solving, decision making, and knowledge representation may be
accomplished using a system of formal logic (Rich and Knight, 1991; Luger and Stubblefield,
1993), although the application of a heuristic and formal logic allows for a better model of
human cognition (Rich and Knight, 1991). Axioms of elementary logic define relationships
between entities. Logical implication is one such axiom, in which the truth value associated with
some antecedent implies a truth value to some consequence (Luger and Stubblefield, 1993).
Formal logic provides a method for drawing certain conclusions in a formal, rigorous manner
through rules of inference. A well-formed, or sound, rule of inference is one that always draws
conclusions that are valid given the system of logic being used (Luger and Stubblefield, 1993).
Mathematical deduction is a sound rule of inference that given P → Q, and P, allows the
conclusion Q to be drawn (Rich and Knight, 1991). Given this definition, it follows that
deduction is most likely accomplished using forward chaining, that is processing productions
from an initial state to produce valid inferences. Induction is a paradigm for learning that uses
observations of a specific instance of a phenomenon to build general rules that explain it (Luger
and Stubblefield, 1993). For example, after observing that a black cat crossed one’s path
immediately before tripping, one might induce that every time one sees are black cat, a trip is
eminent. It is an unsound rule of inference (Luger and Stubblefield, 1993) and as in the previous
example, the general rules developed may be incorrect. Abduction is another rule of inference,
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that given: P → Q, and Q, allows the assumption that P is true to be drawn (Luger and
Stubblefield, 1993). Given this definition, the intuitive method for producing relevant inferences
by abduction is to use backward chaining, that is starting from a goal state and processing
production rules in reverse order to determine the necessary initial conditions. Being an unsound
rule of inference, assumptions drawn using abduction may or may not be true (Luger and
Stubblefield, 1993). Attaching some quantification of the risk of incorrectness to assumptions
made with abduction enables abduction to be particularly useful in many incomplete problem
domains. A non-monotonic reasoning system, that is, a system in which truth values may
change, such as a system designed to facilitate non-scripted interaction with humans, is a natural
application area for abduction.
For the purposes of the present work, let prediction be defined as connecting a particular
precursor state with its successor state one or more times and the subsequent identification of the
probable successor state when initial conditions are similar enough. In synthetic characters,
prediction can be used to adapt responses to more appropriate ones, to maintain internal
consistency, and by applying the results of the prediction to its mental representation to evaluate
its reasoning.
Planning is “the process of analyzing an entire sequence of steps in advance to discover
where it will lead before the first step is taken” (Rich and Knight, 1991). In a complete problem
domain, that is a domain in which all necessary knowledge is accessible at the time planning
occurs, planning may be easily accomplished by brute force using deduction and forward
chaining (Rich and Knight, 1991). In incomplete problem domains, however, knowledge of the
effects of actions on the environment may not be available, making planning impossible by
deduction. In these incomplete domains, it is necessary to perform planning based on
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speculative or anticipatory computation. This type of predictive planning uses abduction to plan
responses beyond these local areas of incompleteness.
Chen et al. (2001 b) proposes a novel cognitive model based on a logical theory of
actions that is able to reason about the character's knowledge, actions, and events. The system
allows for actions with duration to be represented, uses prediction and a unique specification
language to tailor the actions and events specified in a narrative description in an additive
fashion, and a hierarchical planning system (Chen et al., 2001 b).
Chen et al.'s planner uses abductive reasoning via a resolution theorem prover, which
offers a high degree of similarity between the specification phase and the implementation phase.
In this system, compound actions are equivalent to plans and vice versa. During the execution
phase, compound actions are decomposed into atomic behaviors for execution. The compound
action is therefore described by a conjunction of atomic behaviors, some of which have not yet
been executed. This construction allows the synthetic character to be highly reactive to new
stimulus and to verify the predictive nature of the plan at each step (Chen et al., 2001 b).
Chen et al.'s (2001 b) system interweaves perceiving the environment, planning, and
acting on the environment in a single, common process. Sensor events serve as preconditions for
successor states, choice control variables, or terminating conditions for selected actions.
Planning is predictive and functions in a progressive order. Execution of actions is allowed to
begin when the first primitive behavior is reached. Any state has the ability to nullify successive
steps in the plan, causing generation of a new plan to occur immediately (Chen et al., 2001 b).
While this method of planning seems to conflict with the definition offered by Rich and Knight
(1991), it is actually a small deviation that allows faster response times, more dynamic response
to changing conditions, and the ability to take instruction from the user.
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Missiaen proposes a planner using abduction (Missiaen, 1991). Like Chen et al.,
Missiaen’s system is based on the Event Calculus, but Missiaen does not interweave perception,
planning and action. His system uses a basic formalism in which the goal clause implies a set
containing the assumptions that, along with the domain rules of the given problem, prove the
goal clause. Localization of the problem domain is employed to decompose complex problems
into critical sub-problems on which abductive planning is used. Missiaen goes on to describe an
implementation of this system for planning the assembly of robots (Missiaen, 1991).
Abductive planning in decision making tasks has also been shown to be beneficial (Fox,
1999). Decision making in this context is defined as the process through which a character
creates a plan of action to fulfill its needs. Fox proposes an algorithm that specifies a step-wise
plan generator, evaluator, and assembler as a solution for a specific, but open-ended problem.
To accomplish this, Fox employs a collection of information processing strategies that arrange
potential plan steps into a taxonomical hierarchy, assess the plan steps using feature-based
pattern matching and generate a statement of belief as to its relevance, and assemble the
composite plan in a best-first manner, i.e., focus on a specific need and select the best plan-steps
to fulfill that need. Abduction is employed during the classification of the potential plan-steps in
order to find the best solution. In this case, the classification system generates a set of findings
with respect to a group of hypotheses and abductive reasoning is used to derive an explanation of
the findings that leads to the best composite (Fox, 1999).
Ajjanagadde (1993) proposes a system of 'generate and test' that is employed in many
modern expert systems that incorporates background knowledge. Using the 'generate and test'
method, backward chaining is used to generate a set of probable hypotheses, each of which are
tested using the known facts to determine the most likely assumption. Ajjanagadde suggests that
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this testing process should occur with some limited form of forward reasoning based on
background knowledge. This distinction is important to processes such as planning
(Ajjanagadde, 1993). Ajjanagadde’s method is very similar to Klein’s (1997) RPD model of
human decision making.
Satoh and Yamamoto (2002) illustrate another instance in which agents (autonomous
programs) are required to function with incomplete information. Given that agents must be able
to communicate with other agents (Ferber, 1999) and that in many multi-agent systems
communication failures caused by network latency or simply by the other agent's postponement
of its decision, agents engaged in dialogue are often required to form beliefs in order to continue
processing (Satoh and Yamamoto, 2002). In short, a belief is defined as an agent's default
reasoning about some other agent or object (Satoh and Yamamoto, 2002). Satoh and Yamamoto
(2002) propose a system that allows the agent to continue computation even when
communication is not guaranteed. This system is based on a speculative belief computation
using abduction (Satoh and Yamamoto, 2002). Essentially, when a required response is not
present, the system uses a default hypothesis as a response and continues computation. When
the response is received, the speculative computation is verified and either validated or
invalidated.
Satoh and Yamamoto's basic algorithm is as follows:
1. Each agent prepares a tentative answer for each possible question at the beginning of
computation
2. When an agent asks a question of another, the agent uses its own tentative answer to
continue computation as it waits for the response
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3. When the response arrives, if the response validates the tentative answer, the agent
continues processing. If, however, the response invalidates the tentative answer, the
agent suspends computation, revises its belief, restarts processing based on the new
belief, and updates its default answer to reflect the new answer.
In this instance, slow communications do not halt the system. While the information
computed may not be accurate, as would be the case if a desired communiqué never appeared,
but would have contained information contrary to the tentative answer, but this possibility
always occurs when abduction is used. In a multi-agent system as Satoh and Yamamoto
describe, the use of abduction implies that most computations at any given time may be labeled
as tentative and subject to revision. From a philosophical point of view, this is acceptable as it
closely models human communication (Satoh and Yamamoto, 2002).
Synthetic characters designed to display lexical and creative intentionality must be
implemented with a computational cognitive model that supports automatacity, deliberate
cognition, metacognition, domain-specific reasoning, decision making, planning and adaptive
response, and learning and memory. While many excellent and well-formed theories have been
presented, none support all the features mentioned above.
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CHAPTER THREE: DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In the work, a model of personality that incorporated a trait-based taxonomy as expressed
by the FFM and aspects of the psychological behaviorism theory as expressed by Staats was
implemented. Additionally, a hierarchical model of mood and emotion with both dimensional
and categorical features was implemented. Finally, a cognitive model that allows for automatic
cognition with respect to natural language was implemented.
During the literature review presented in Chapter Two, it became clear to the author that
in all three models required to create the work, two overwhelming similarities existed: (a) the
psychological support for two distinct methods, a lexical method and a creative method, and (b)
that the lexical method of each model was sufficient only for the implementation of lexical
intentionality, but that the combination of lexical methods of one model with the lexical methods
of the other two was sufficient for the implementation of creative intentionality as defined above.
From the personality and emotive perspectives, Staats’ psychological behaviorism relies on a
lexicon of pattern-response pairs that are learned, and that can be combined or expanded to meet
the requirements of new patterns. From the cognitive perspective, the concept of automatic
responses to highly over-learned or practiced stimuli also relies on a lexicon of pattern-response
pairs. Therefore, to implement lexical intentionality, any system that is able to utilize a patternresponse lexicon is sufficient. The implementation of creative intentionality was accomplished
by adding a production system that allowed for the transformation of responses from the lexicon
to meet the requirements of the current state. For example, a basic lexicon of pattern-response
pairs was implemented to allow a synthetic character to respond appropriately to lexical atoms of
human language. This system would satisfy the needs of lexical intentionality if it could
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incorporate every ubiquitous word, phrase, and sentence in the target natural language and
sensible constraints were placed on the input (i.e., not allowing the entire text of an encyclopedia
to serve as a single input, etc.). Creative intentionality could be added to the above system by
adding a set of production rules that govern composition and rare grammatical forms.
The synthetic personality implemented in the work operates in the domain of natural
language. It implemented lexical communication and automatic cognition in the form of a CaseBased Reasoning (CBR) system. The CBR algorithm de-emphasizes the use of general rules,
and instead stores problem cases and their solutions in long-term memory (Luger and
Stubblefield, 1993). CBR is similar to analogical reasoning as discussed previously in that if the
algorithm can’t match the current problem to one its case library, it attempts to find a close
match to the problem and transform that case’s solution to fit.
To implement part of the cognitive model required for the work, a CBR system was
implemented so that cases are defined by natural language strings of input and the responses take
the form of natural language strings. This algorithm implemented lexical matching of natural
language atoms and allows the synthetic character to display lexical intentionality and automatic
cognition. It also fit with Staats’ psychological behaviorism theory and filled the role of the
linguistic-cognitive repertoires for the work.
To implement a basic personality, a model that combined both the tenets and structure of
the FFM with a lexical and creative method for behavior selection was implemented. The
synthetic personality was implemented by tracking five numeric values that correspond to an
Extroversion scale, a Neurosis scale, an Agreeableness scale, an Openness scale, and a
Conscientiousness scale. These scales ranged from 0.0 to 1.0, with 0.0 ≤ x < 0.25 denoting an
abnormally low range, 0.26 ≤ x ≤ 0.9 denoting a ‘normal’ range, 0.91 < x ≤ 1.0 denoting an
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abnormally high range. Each of these scales impacted behavior selection, mood state traversal,
and emotional state traversal as discussed below. In addition to these five values, each synthetic
personality was defined with a disposition point that was skewed towards either a positive mood
or a negative mood.
In the work, personalities with low values of the Neuroticism scale were expected to be
emotionally fixed, while high values of the scale were expected to yield highly labile
personalities. This was accomplished by a multiplicative increase to the signal strength of any
input that is representational of the Neurosis factor. In other words, the signal strength of a given
input was multiplied by the result of dividing the Neurosis factor by 0.5 (the neutral setting). In
this manner, highly neurotic personality types more easily traversed to different emotional states,
while personality types with a low Neurosis factor required higher signal strength inputs to
successfully change state.
It was expected that a personality with a high Extroversion value appeared to have a more
positive mood than a personality with a neutral setting. A personality with a low Extroversion
value was expected to appear to suffer from a more negative mood. In the work, this was
accomplished by changing the degree with which mood changes over time in response to the
defined Extroversion value and by skewing the changes in either a positive or negative manner
as dictated by the positive correlation between the Extroversion rating and mood.
A low Openness value in a personality was expected to be viewed as less emotionally
intense. A high Openness value was expected to be seen as more emotionally intense than
neutral or closed individuals. These criteria were met by implementing a multiplier applied to
the signal strength when identifying the emotional intensity level.
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Values within the high range of the Agreeableness scale were expected to cause
personalities to have a more positive disposition and an initially higher mood value, while values
within the low range of the Agreeableness scale began the simulation with a lower mood and a
lower disposition setting.

Positive
Mood

Negative
Mood
Figure 1 - Mood Model
The models of mood and emotion that were implemented can be explained by a beach
ball metaphor with six slice-shaped sections and two hemispheres (see figures 1 and 2). Inputs
to this model should be viewed as vectors in a three dimensional space (i.e., destination point and
velocity), and thus emotional state transitions can be calculated by vector addition. These
vectors are bounded by the skin of the sphere. The Openness factor mentioned above can be
viewed as a multiplier that is applied to the velocity value of the vector. The top hemisphere will
indicate positive mood, while the bottom hemisphere will indicate a negative mood. In this
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metaphor, mood is calculated each time there is a change in emotional state by calculating the
directional change to mood caused by the last emotional state.

Positive
Mood

Equivalence
Classes of
Emotions

Negative
Mood

Figure 2 - Emotion Model
Each of the six slices represents a permutation on the set of human emotions, or an
equivalence class of like emotions. In the work, the author labeled these equivalence classes: (a)
joy, (b) anger, (c) sadness, (d) disgust, (e) surprise, and (f) fear, in accordance with Ekman’s
(1992) six basic emotions. The outer skin of the sphere represents the maximum intensity of
emotion, and the origin of the sphere represents zero emotional intensity. An important feature
of the representation is the varied width of the slice as one moves from the equator towards the
poles of the sphere. This is important when one considers emotional lability – the farther from
the origin of the sphere along the z-axis, the easier it becomes to change from one equivalence
class to the next.
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The Neurosis factor effectively dictates the point on the z-axis of the sphere (the height
from the origin) at which the current emotional state calculations occur. In this manner, the
width of the slice is narrowed, and the difference between zero intensity and maximum intensity
is reduced as the point is moved away from the origin on the z-axis. As the calculation point
approaches the skin of the sphere, the width of the slices approach zero, so that a highly labile
character will be able to change equivalence classes with very little stimulus. As the point of
calculation approaches the xy plane, the width of the slices increases to the maximum size, so
that a highly stabile character will require significant stimulus to change its emotional state.
In addition to the CBR system that fulfilled the linguistic-cognitive repertoires of Staats’
psychological behaviorism model, another CBR system was implemented that mapped the
emotional-motivational repertoire of basic behaviors. In this system, each case represented
stimulus/mental state-behavior pairs and a case-specific fitness function. Since the work was
implemented in the domain of natural language, the stimulus portion was specified by a natural
language string. The mental state portion of the case was specified in terms of the emotional
state, and the intensity that successfully triggered the specified behavior. Behaviors ranged from
transformations of natural language strings, creative expression in the form of natural language
strings, mood state traversals, emotional state traversals, subtle changes to personality traits (in
rare cases), or any combination of these processes.

Hypotheses
There are three methods of testing an implementation of a synthetic personality. The first
is to verify that the software and the models are logically equivalent. That is to say, to test that
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for all combinations of parameters, the software performs as predicted by the models. If this first
test is successfully passed, anything that can be argued about the models is also true of the
software and vice versa. The second is to verify the veracity of the models from a psychological
standpoint. In other words, to ensure that the models behave as predicted by relevant
psychological theory. Of course, the ultimate measure of the success of any synthetic personality
is to test the believability of the responses generated by the system to human users. The last
measure is outside the scope of this dissertation for two reasons: 1) in order for such a test to
have validity, the synthetic personality would require significant content development (i.e. world
knowledge, contextual knowledge), and 2) the systems presented in this dissertation are
necessary, but not sufficient to create believable interactions with humans outside of iconic,
innocuous exchanges. Specifically, the project would need increased NLU processing capability,
the ability to intelligently modify phrases, sentences and paragraphs, increased cognitive
abilities, and possibly perceptual and expressive systems capable of expression, gaze, and
gesture.
The intent of this project was to create psychologically relevant implementations of
synthetic personality, and synthetic personality dynamics, therefore the following hypotheses
were considered:

Hypothesis One: The theoretical models of synthetic personality presented are logically
equivalent to the implemented synthetic personality for all cases.
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Hypothesis Two: The models of synthetic personality implemented in the planned work
are true to the psychological theories on which they are based in all cases in which the effects of
personality traits are predictable with certainty.

MODELS

SOFTWARE

HUMAN
BELIEVABILITY
PSYCHOLOGICAL
BASIS
Figure 3 - Veracity of Synthetic Personalities

Evaluation Methods
Two methods of evaluation were used to verify the hypotheses. Both methods employed
a synthetic personality and an independent machine observer that was be constructed and
initialized with identical personality traits and emotion models. The observer processed an input
through its version of the emotion model and personality traits, and recorded its estimates of the
character’s mental states. Simultaneously, the character being tested processed an identical
input, logged its mental state, and responded via the user interface. Thus, at the end of any test,
the logs contained both the actual mental state of the character based on the input, and the
observer’s estimation of what the mental state should be. In this manner, the logical equivalence
between the models and the software was evaluated.
In order to accurately test the psychological veracity of the models, a systematic and
complete approach was necessary. In some cases, specifically those cases in which a single trait
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was high or low, and the other traits are neutral, an accurate prediction of behavior based on
psychological theories and results was possible. However, a similar predictive evaluation of all
possible combinations of traits and definitions was not possible, simply because complex
interactions undoubtedly exist between multiple traits and not enough is known about these
interactions in humans to predict the results in the models. Therefore, two distinct sets of test
cases were called for and implemented. In each evaluation method, a specific set of test cases
were run, as appropriate to the scope and intention of each method. In order to rule out chance,
each test, in either method, was repeated twenty times. Since each test case was mutually
exclusive from the other test cases, results from a given test case were analyzed and conclusions
drawn against the particular parameters that define the test case and comparisons to baseline data
were drawn.
A synthetic personality was defined with both permanently fixed and test case specific
data. Fixed data included the definition of a weight table for the emotional state transitions, a
weight table for the intensity state transitions, and a fixed set of CBR cases that defined a limited
cognitive model for NLU. Test case specific data included definitions of individual traits, and
individual mood and disposition settings.
The test cases described below each used the following weight tables:
Table 1 - Emotion Model Weight Table
State
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear

Joy
0.0
0.65
0.85
0.65
0.05
0.45

Anger
0.55
0.0
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.15

Sadness
0.85
0.05
0.0
0.35
0.05
0.05
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Disgust
0.35
0.1
0.05
0.0
0.05
0.05

Surprise
0.1
0.05
0.25
0.05
0.0
0.05

Fear
0.2
0.65
0.35
0.15
0.05
0.0

Table 2 - Emotion State Intensity Weight Table
State Intensity
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.6

0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.6

0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.7

0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.7

0.3
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.8

0.3
0.5
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.8

0.3
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.9

0.3
0.6
1.0
0.1
0.6
1.0

For consistency between test cases, each test began with the emotion model artificially
set to the joy state, and the mood and disposition equal to one another and set at negative,
neutral, or positive (positively correlated with the Agreeableness trait). Personality trait
definitions varied per test case, but within each case, were artificially fixed. Each test case was
defined by the systematic evaluation of a set of inputs designed to test the transition between
every state. Input evaluation included evaluation of the content and evaluation of the signal
strength of the content, where the signal strength was required to exceed the weight associated
with the input specified in the cognitive model for NLU.
To reduce the complexity of the evaluation methods, natural language inputs were
simplified to single words, communicating both the nature of the input and the target emotion.
For example, instead of adding a case to handle the phrase ‘You look absolutely lovely!’ a case
was created to handle the emotional state the phrase was intended to be reduced to ‘joy’.
Therefore, the transitions used in testing were reduced to mapping a current emotional state, an
input, and the signal strength of the input to an expected emotional state. CBR cases for each of
the inputs were constructed as described below:
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Table 3 - Inputs used for Evaluation
State
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness

Input
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear

Strength
0.2
0.6
0.9
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.05
0.5
0.8
0.3
0.05
0.15
0.7
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.7
0.6
0.05
0.025
0.5
0.025
0.6
0.9
0.2
0.9
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.8
0.1
0.05
0.025
0.2
0.3

Target
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Anger
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness
Sadness

State
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
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Input
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear

Strength
0.7
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.6
0.025
0.3
0.05
0.025
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.025
0.025
0.025
0.025
0.05
0.025
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.7
0.4
0.1
0.025
0.025
0.025
0.45

Target
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Disgust
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise
Joy
Anger
Sadness
Disgust
Surprise
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear
Fear

Test case specific trait definitions will be described with the definition of the test case
below. In each test case, mood and disposition were initialized to the same value, 0.25, 0.5, or
0.75 for personalities with an Agreeableness factor of low, neutral, or high, respectively.

Evaluation Method One
In this method, baseline data and data about the isolated effects caused by manipulating
single personality traits were acquired. Hypothesis One was evaluated by a comparison of all
observer predictions of state and the actual states of the synthetic personality caused by
evaluating the input. A match between the predicted state and the actual state for every input in
each test case was identified as the metric for accepting Hypothesis One. Additionally, as
isolated effects of high or low settings to a single personality trait on the emotion model could be
predicted with certainty by the psychological theories upon which the models are based,
Hypothesis Two was also tested by this method. That is to say, for each test case in method one,
the mapping of input and current emotional state to the next emotional state, as specified above,
was examined. It is acknowledged that the weights ascribed to the emotion model were
somewhat arbitrary, but the same weight table was used in every test, and therefore the arbitrary
definition of the weights did not impact the soundness of these measures. Additionally, for each
test case, general trends of behavior were predicted based on relevant FFM research.
Verification of the predicted trend by a manual inspection of the actual behavior produced by the
system was performed. The razor for Hypothesis Two was identified as the matching of the
actual behavioral trends of the synthetic personality and the trends predicted by psychological
theory in every case.
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In each of the test cases below, each of these inputs were artificially created and passed
into the character. The resulting emotion was verified against these predicted values and
discrepancies were noted. Additionally, the inputs were passed into the observer, and the
internal validity of the computational models was verified as described above.

Test Case One: As a baseline, the system was tested against a personality defined by “neutral”
settings for all of the five personality traits. This test case also provided “neutral” emotion
results for comparison in future evaluations.
Table 4 - Trait Definitions for Test Case One
Trait
O
C
E
A
N

TC1
N
N
N
N
N

In this test case, psychological evidence predicted that the synthetic personality would
react exactly as specified according to the emotion weight table, the intensity weight table, and
mood would be tightly coupled with disposition and emotional state. In other words, the
emotion model and the intensity model would be followed precisely, and mood would follow the
general trend of emotion (positively correlated), returning to the disposition in the absence of
changes to the emotion system over time.
For example, if the synthetic personality was in the Joy state, and receives an input of
Anger with a signal strength of 0.6, it was expected that the synthetic personality would traverse
to the Anger state, with low intensity (0), and its mood would begin to decline from the present
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level towards the negative axis. Similarly, if the next input was Anger with a signal strength of
0.1, it was predicted that the synthetic personality would remain in the Anger state with a
moderate intensity (4), and its mood would continue to decline towards the negative axis.

Test Cases Two through Six: In these test cases, each of the five personality traits were
elevated to the high level in turn, while the other personality traits remained at the neutral setting
(e.g., in test case four, Extroversion were set at the high level, while Neurosis, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, and Openness were set to the neutral level). These cases tested changes in
the emotion and mood models caused by elevation of one personality trait.
Table 5 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Two through Six
Trait
O
C
E
A
N

TC2
H
N
N
N
N

TC3
N
H
N
N
N

TC4
N
N
H
N
N

TC5
N
N
N
H
N

TC6
N
N
N
N
H

In Test Case Two, since the Openness factor is set to high, it was predicted by
psychological theory that the synthetic personality would react exactly as specified by the
emotion weight table, and that mood would be positively related to disposition and emotional
state. The intensity of the emotion would be elevated with respect to the defined intensity table.
That is to say, for the inputs that signaled a change in intensity in the baseline data, a bigger
change in intensity would be present.
In other words, the synthetic personality defined by Test Case Two would be seen as
more intensely emotional. By contrast, it would not move between emotional states more easily
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as would be the case if Neurosis was elevated, but would experience more intensity of emotion
in any given state than the baseline data (or any other personality defined with a neutral
Openness factor). To be clear, signal strength used for calculating the intensity level of emotion
for personalities defined in this test case was multiplied by a value equal to the Openness factor
divided by the neutral definition of the Openness factor (in this case, 0.95 / 0.5 = 1.9).
In Test Case Three, since the Conscientiousness factor was set to high, it was predicted
that the synthetic personality would react exactly as specified according to the emotion weight
table, the intensity weight table, and mood would be tightly coupled with disposition and
emotional state. In other words, this test case would exactly mirror the baseline data since FFM
theory shows no correlation between Conscientiousness and emotion, intensity, or mood.
In Test Case Four, since relevant psychological research indicated that the Extroversion
rating is positively correlated to mood, and since Extroversion was set to high in this case, the
synthetic personality was expected to react exactly as specified according to the emotion weight
table, and the intensity weight table, but mood would not be tightly coupled with disposition and
emotional state. Instead, mood would be more positive with respect to the baseline data.
In other words, while emotional state traversal and intensity state traversal would not be
different from the baseline data, mood would tend to be more positive in scale, and positive more
of the time than in the baseline data. Additionally, negative moves in mood would be smaller
than in the baseline data. For example, if the baseline data showed that a change from the Joy
state to the Anger state should lead to a decrease in the mood value of 0.05, the synthetic
personality might have shown the same traversal in emotion but a decrease in mood of only 0.02
or a similar value. Likewise, while baseline data might have shown that a traversal from the
Anger state to the Joy state resulted in an increase in mood of 0.05, the synthetic personality
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might have shown the same traversal in emotion but an increase in mood of 0.10 or a similar
value. In this manner, since the negative changes in mood were smaller, the synthetic
personality remained in a positive mood longer than a personality with a neutral Extroversion
rating, and when the mood dipped into the negative range, it would not dip as far and would
regain positivity more easily.
In Test Case Five, since Agreeableness was elevated to the high level, psychological
research indicated that the synthetic personality would react exactly as specified by the intensity
weight table, and that mood would be tightly coupled with disposition and emotional state. The
emotional state, however, was expected to show a higher incidence of positive axis emotion.
That is to say, for the inputs that signaled a transition to a negative axis emotion may have
resulted in no transition from the joy state. This was accomplished by increasing the signal
strength of positive axis inputs, and decreasing the signal strength of negative axis inputs.
For example, if an input was associated with a traversal to the Joy state and was given a
signal strength of 0.04, and the baseline personality was in the Surprise state, no traversal would
occur, given the weight tables described above. If the same input was provided to the synthetic
personality in this test case, the signal strength would be multiplied by 125% and a transition to
the Joy state would occur. Similarly if an input was associated with a traversal to the Anger
state, and was given a signal strength of 0.044, and the baseline personality is in the Joy state, no
traversal to the Anger state would occur. If the same input was provided to the personality
defined in this case, however, the signal strength would be multiplied by 125% and a traversal
would occur.
In Test Case Six, a highly Neurotic personality was created and in accordance with FFM
theory, it was predicted that the synthetic personality’s mood would be tightly coupled with
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disposition and emotional state. The emotional state or the intensity state, however, would
transition to other emotion or intensity states with signal strengths that were lower than required
in the baseline data. That is to say, for the inputs that failed to signal a transition to an alternate
emotion or intensity in the baseline data, transitions may have occurred.
For example, if an input was created that signals a traversal to the Joy state and was given
a signal strength of 0.4, and the baseline personality was in the Disgust state, no traversal would
occur. If, however, this input was passed into the personality defined in this case, the signal
strength was multiplied by a value equal to the Neurosis factor divided by the neutral definition
of the Neurosis factor (in this case, 0.95 / 0.5 = 1.9), which would result in a sufficient signal
strength to trigger a traversal to the Joy state. Likewise, if the input signaled a traversal to the
Joy state and was given a signal strength of 0.15, and the baseline personality was in the Joy
state, the resulting intensity level would be 3. If this input was passed into the personality
defined by this case, the signal strength is again modified by the method described above, which
would result in an intensity value of 7.

Test Cases Seven through Eleven: In these test cases, each of the five personality traits was
lowered to the low level in turn, while the other personality traits remained at the neutral setting
(e.g., in test case nine, Extroversion was set at the low level, while Neurosis, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, and Openness were all set to the neutral level). These cases tested changes in
the emotion model caused by a low setting of one personality trait.
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Table 6 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Seven through Eleven
Trait
O
C
E
A
N

TC7
L
N
N
N
N

TC8
N
L
N
N
N

TC9
N
N
L
N
N

TC10 TC11
N
N
N
N
N
N
L
N
N
L

In Test Case Seven, since the Openness factor was set to low, it was predicted by
psychological theory that the synthetic personality would react exactly as specified by the
emotion weight table, and that mood would be positively related to disposition and emotional
state. The intensity of the emotion, however, would be lower with respect to the defined
intensity table. That is to say, for the inputs that signaled a change in intensity in the baseline
data, a smaller change, or no change at all in intensity would be present.
In other words, the synthetic personality defined by Test Case Seven would be seen as
less intensely emotional. By contrast, it would appear to be flatter in affect as would be the case
if Neurosis was lowered, but would experience less intensity of emotion in any given state than
the baseline data (or any other personality defined with a neutral Openness factor). To be clear,
signal strength used for calculating the intensity level of emotion for personalities defined in this
test case was multiplied by a value equal to the Openness factor divided by the neutral definition
of the Openness factor (in this case, 0.25 / 0.5 = 0.5).
In Test Case Eight, since the Conscientiousness factor was set to low, it was predicted
that the synthetic personality would react exactly as specified according to the emotion weight
table, the intensity weight table, and mood would be tightly coupled with disposition and
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emotional state. In other words, this test case would exactly mirror the baseline data since FFM
theory shows no correlation between Conscientiousness and emotion, intensity, or mood.
In Test Case Nine, since relevant psychological research indicated that the Extroversion
rating is positively correlated to mood, and since Extroversion was set to low in this case, the
synthetic personality was expected to react exactly as specified according to the emotion weight
table, and the intensity weight table, but mood was not expected to be tightly coupled with
disposition and emotional state. Instead, mood was expected to be more negative with respect to
the baseline data.
In other words, while emotional state traversal and intensity state traversal would not be
different from the baseline data, mood would tend to be more negative in scale, and negative
more often than in the baseline data. Additionally, positive moves in mood would be smaller
than in the baseline data. For example, if the baseline data showed that a change from the Joy
state to the Anger state should lead to a decrease in the mood value of 0.05, the synthetic
personality might have shown the same traversal in emotion but a decrease in mood of 0.10 or a
similar value. Likewise, while baseline data might have shown that a traversal from the Anger
state to the Joy state resulted in an increase in mood of 0.05, the synthetic personality might have
shown the same traversal in emotion but an increase in mood of 0.02 or similar value. In this
manner, since the positive changes in mood were smaller, the synthetic personality would remain
in a negative mood longer than a personality with a neutral Extroversion rating, and when the
mood traversed into the positive range, would not go as far and would regain negativity more
easily.
In Test Case Ten, since Agreeableness was low, psychological research indicated that the
synthetic personality would react exactly as specified by the intensity weight table, and that
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mood would be tightly coupled with disposition and emotional state. The emotional state,
however, was expected to show a higher incidence of negative axis emotion. That is to say, for
the inputs that signaled a transition to a positive axis emotion no transition from a negative axis
state would result. This was accomplished by decreasing the signal strength of positive axis
inputs, and increasing the signal strength of negative axis inputs.
For example, if an input was associated with a traversal to the Joy state and was given a
signal strength of 0.05, and the baseline personality was in the Surprise state, a traversal would
occur, given the weight tables described above. If the same input was provided to the synthetic
personality in this test case, the signal strength would be multiplied by 65% and no transition to
the Joy state would occur. Similarly if an input was associated with a traversal to the Anger
state, and was given a signal strength of 0.085, and the baseline personality was in the Joy state,
a traversal to the Anger state would occur. If the same input was provided to the personality
defined in this case, however, the signal strength would be multiplied by 65% and no traversal
would occur.
In Test Case Eleven, personality with a low Neurosis factor was created and in
accordance with FFM theory, it was predicted that the synthetic personality’s mood would be
tightly coupled with disposition and emotional state. The emotional state or the intensity state,
however, was expected to transition to other emotion or intensity states only at signal strengths
that were much higher than required in the baseline data. That is to say, for the inputs that
signaled a transition to an alternate emotion or intensity in the baseline data, transitions may not
have occurred.
For example, if an input was created that signals a traversal to the Joy state and was given
a signal strength of 0.75, and the baseline personality was in the Disgust state, a traversal to the
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Joy state would occur. If, however, this input was passed into the personality defined in this
case, the signal strength was multiplied by a value equal to the Neurosis factor divided by the
neutral definition of the Neurosis factor (in this case, 0.25 / 0.5 = 0.5), which would result in
insufficient signal strength to trigger a traversal to the Joy state. Likewise, if the input signaled a
traversal to the Joy state and was given a signal strength of 0.15, and the baseline personality was
in the Joy state, the resulting intensity level would be 3. If this input was passed into the
personality defined by this case, the signal strength was again modified by the method described
above, which would result in an intensity value of 0.

Evaluation Method Two
In this method, the interactions between personality traits were too complex or too
dependent to be adequately predicted. As such, test cases in this method could not be used to
satisfy Hypothesis Two and should be viewed as exploratory tests of the complex interactions
between personality traits. Since these test cases attempted to verify that the complex
interactions of the personality modeling do not adversely effect the proper functioning of the
emotion and mood modeling, the cases specified below were used to satisfy Hypothesis One. To
that end, the same set of inputs was run as in method one, but verification that the emotion model
actually transitions to the target state was not performed. Additionally, due to the complexity
and unknown nature of the interactions between multiple personality traits, no predictions of
general trends in behavior could be made. Instead, the data generated in this method was used to
verify that the personality model did not impact the internal validity of the computational models
as indicated by the ability of the independent observer to accurately estimate the mental state of
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the character. Current state, input, signal strength and resulting state data were recorded,
however, for use in future work.

Test Cases Twelve through Twenty-One: In these test cases, the interaction between two high
values, and three neutral values of personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion and Neurosis
were set to high, while Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness were set to neutral).
Table 7 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Twelve through Twenty-One
Trait TC12 TC13 TC14 TC15 TC16 TC17 TC18 TC19 TC20 TC21
O
H
H
H
H
N
N
N
N
N
N
C
H
N
N
N
H
H
H
N
N
N
E
N
H
N
N
H
N
N
H
H
N
A
N
N
H
N
N
H
N
H
N
H
N
N
N
N
H
N
N
H
N
H
H
Test Cases Twenty-Two through Thirty-One: In these test cases, the interaction between two
low values, and three neutral values of personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion and
Neurosis were set to low, while Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness were set to
neutral).
Table 8 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Twenty-two through Thirty-One
Trait TC22 TC23 TC24 TC25 TC26 TC27 TC28 TC29 TC30 TC31
O
L
L
L
L
N
N
N
N
N
N
C
L
N
N
N
L
L
L
N
N
N
E
N
L
N
N
L
N
N
L
L
N
A
N
N
L
N
N
L
N
L
N
L
N
N
N
N
L
N
N
L
N
L
L
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Test Cases Thirty-Two through Forty-One: These test cases tested the effect of three high
traits and two neutral traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness were set to
high while Extroversion and Neurosis were set to neutral).
Table 9 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Thirty-Two through Forty-One
Trait TC32 TC33 TC34 TC35 TC36 TC37 TC38 TC39 TC40 TC41
O
H
H
H
H
H
H
N
N
N
N
C
H
H
H
N
N
N
H
H
H
N
E
H
N
N
H
H
N
H
H
N
H
A
N
H
N
H
N
H
H
N
H
H
N
N
N
H
N
H
H
N
H
H
H
Test Cases Forty-Two through Fifty-One: These test cases tested the effect of three low traits
and two neutral traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness were set to high
while Extroversion and Neurosis were set to neutral).
Table 10 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Forty-Two through Fifty-One
Trait TC42 TC43 TC44 TC45 TC46 TC47 TC48 TC49 TC50 TC51
O
L
L
L
L
L
L
N
N
N
N
C
L
L
L
N
N
N
L
L
L
N
E
L
N
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
L
A
N
L
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
N
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
L
L
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Test Cases Fifty-Two through Fifty-Six: These test cases tested the effect of four high traits
and two neutral traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extroversion were
set to high while Neurosis was set to neutral).
Table 11 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Fifty-Two through Fifty-Six
Trait TC52 TC53 TC54 TC55 TC56
O
H
H
H
H
N
C
H
H
H
N
H
E
H
H
N
H
H
A
H
N
H
H
H
N
N
H
H
H
H
Test Cases Fifty-Seven through Sixty-One: These test cases tested the effect of four low traits
and two neutral traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extroversion were
set to low while Neurosis was set to neutral).
Table 12 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Fifty-Seven through Sixty-One
Trait TC57 TC58 TC59 TC60 TC61
O
L
L
L
L
N
C
L
L
L
N
L
E
L
L
N
L
L
A
L
N
L
L
L
N
N
L
L
L
L
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Test Case Sixty-Two: This test case simulated the effect of five high personality traits. This
test case also provided “high” emotion results for comparison in future evaluations.
Table 13 - Trait Definitions for Test Case Sixty-Two
Trait TC62
O
H
C
H
E
H
A
H
N
H
Test Cases Sixty-Three through Sixty-Seven: In these test cases, each of the five personality
traits was set at a low level in turn, while the other personality traits were set to high (e.g., in test
case sixty-five, Extroversion was set at the low level, while Neurosis, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, and Openness were set to the high level).
Table 14 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Sixty-Three through Sixty-Seven
Trait TC63 TC64 TC65 TC66 TC67
O
L
H
H
H
H
C
H
L
H
H
H
E
H
H
L
H
H
A
H
H
H
L
H
N
H
H
H
H
L
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Test Cases Sixty-Eight through Seventy-Seven: In these test cases, the interaction between
two low values, and three high values of personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion and
Neurosis were set to low, while Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness were set to high).
Table 15 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Sixty-Eight through Seventy-Seven
Trait TC68 TC69 TC70 TC71 TC72 TC73 TC74 TC75 TC76 TC77
O
H
H
H
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
C
H
H
H
L
L
L
H
H
H
L
E
H
L
L
H
H
L
H
H
L
H
A
L
H
L
H
L
H
H
L
H
H
N
L
L
H
L
H
H
L
H
H
H
Test Cases Seventy-Eight through Eighty-Seven: These test cases tested the effect of three
low traits and two neutral traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness were set
to high while Extroversion and Neurosis were set to low).
Table 16 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Seventy-Eight through Eighty-Seven
Trait TC78 TC79 TC80 TC81 TC82 TC83 TC84 TC85 TC86 TC87
O
L
L
L
L
L
L
H
H
H
H
C
L
L
L
H
H
H
L
L
L
H
E
L
H
H
L
L
H
L
L
H
L
A
H
L
H
L
H
L
L
H
L
L
N
H
H
L
H
L
L
H
L
L
L
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Test Cases Eighty-Eight through Ninety-two: These test cases tested the effect of four low
traits and one high traits (e.g. Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extroversion
were all set to low while Neurosis was set to high).
Table 17 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Eighty-Eight through Ninety-Two
Trait TC88 TC89 TC90 TC91 TC92
O
L
L
L
L
H
C
L
L
L
H
L
E
L
L
H
L
L
A
L
H
L
L
L
N
H
L
L
L
L

Test Case Ninety-Three: This test case simulated the effect of five low personality traits. This
test case also provided “low” emotion results for comparison in future evaluations.
Table 18 - Trait Definitions for Test Case Ninety-Three
Trait TC93
O
L
C
L
E
L
A
L
N
L
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Test Cases Ninety-Four through One Hundred Thirteen: In these test cases, the interaction
between a single high value, a single low value, and three neutral values of personality traits was
tested (e.g. Extroversion was be set to high, Neurosis was set to low, while Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Openness were set to neutral).
Table 19 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases Ninety-Four through One Hundred Thirteen
Trait TC94 TC95 TC96 TC97 TC98 TC99 TC100 TC101 TC102 TC103
O
H
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
N
N
C
L
N
N
N
H
N
N
N
H
H
E
N
L
N
N
N
H
N
N
L
N
A
N
N
L
N
N
N
H
N
N
L
N
N
N
N
L
N
N
N
H
N
N
Trait TC104 TC105 TC106 TC107 TC108 TC109 TC110 TC111 TC112 TC113
O
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
C
H
L
L
L
N
N
N
N
N
N
E
N
H
N
N
H
H
L
L
N
N
A
N
N
H
N
L
N
H
N
H
L
N
L
N
N
H
N
L
N
H
L
H
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Test Cases One Hundred Fourteen through One Hundred Forty-Three: In these test cases,
the interaction between a two low values, a single high value, and two neutral values of
personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion and Openness were set to low, Agreeableness was
set to high, while Neurosis, Conscientiousness were set to neutral).
Table 20 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases One Hundred Fourteen through One Hundred FortyThree
Trait TC114 TC115 TC116 TC117 TC118 TC119 TC120 TC121 TC122 TC123 TC124
O
H
H
H
H
H
H
N
N
N
L
L
C
L
L
L
N
N
N
H
H
H
H
H
E
L
N
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
A
N
L
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
L
N
N
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
N
Trait TC125 TC126 TC127 TC128 TC129 TC130 TC131 TC132 TC133 TC134 TC135
O
L
N
L
N
L
N
L
N
N
L
L
C
H
N
N
L
N
L
L
L
L
N
L
E
N
H
H
H
H
H
H
L
N
N
N
A
N
L
L
L
N
N
N
H
H
H
H
N
L
L
N
N
L
L
N
N
L
L
N
Trait TC136 TC137 TC138 TC139 TC140 TC141 TC142 TC143
O
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
C
N
N
L
L
N
L
N
N
E
L
L
L
N
N
N
L
L
A
H
H
N
N
L
L
N
L
N
L
N
H
H
H
H
H
H
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Test Cases One Hundred Forty-Four through One Hundred Seventy-Three: In these test
cases, the interaction between a two high values, a single low value, and two neutral values of
personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion and Openness were set to high, Agreeableness
was set to low, while Neurosis, Conscientiousness was set to neutral).
Table 21 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases One Hundred Fourty-Four through One Hundred
Seventy-Three
Trait TC144 TC145 TC146 TC147 TC148 TC149 TC150 TC151 TC152 TC153 TC154
O
H
H
H
H
H
H
N
N
N
L
L
C
L
L
L
N
N
N
H
H
H
H
H
E
L
N
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
A
N
L
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
L
N
N
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
L
N
N
Trait TC155 TC156 TC157 TC158 TC159 TC160 TC161 TC162 TC163 TC164 TC165
O
L
N
L
N
L
N
L
N
N
L
L
C
H
N
N
L
N
L
L
L
L
N
L
E
N
H
H
H
H
H
H
L
N
N
N
A
N
L
L
L
N
N
N
H
H
H
H
N
L
L
N
N
L
L
N
N
L
L
L
Trait TC166 TC167 TC168 TC169 TC170 TC171 TC172 TC173
O
N
L
N
L
L
N
L
N
C
N
N
L
L
N
L
N
N
E
L
L
L
N
N
N
L
L
A
H
H
N
N
L
L
N
L
N
L
N
H
H
H
H
H
H
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Test Cases One Hundred Seventy-Four through One Hundred Ninety-Three: In these test
cases, the interaction between a three low values, a single high value, and one neutral values of
personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Openness were set to low,
Conscientiousness was set to high, while Neurosis was set to neutral).
Table 22 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases One Hundred Seventy-Four through One Hundred
Ninety-Three
Trait TC174 TC175 TC176 TC177 TC178 TC179 TC180 TC181 TC182 TC183
O
H
H
H
H
N
N
N
N
L
L
C
L
L
L
N
L
L
L
H
L
L
E
L
L
N
L
L
L
H
L
L
H
A
L
N
L
L
L
H
L
L
H
L
N
N
L
L
L
H
L
L
L
N
N
Trait TC184 TC185 TC186 TC187 TC188 TC189 TC190 TC191 TC192 TC193
O
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
C
H
L
L
N
H
H
N
N
L
L
E
L
L
N
L
L
N
L
H
H
N
A
L
N
L
L
N
L
H
L
N
H
N
N
H
H
H
L
L
L
L
L
L
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Test Cases One Hundred Ninety-Four through Two Hundred Eleven: In these test cases,
the interaction between a three high values, a single low value, and one neutral values of
personality traits was tested (e.g. Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Openness were set to high,
Conscientiousness was set to low, while Neurosis was set to neutral).
Table 23 - Trait Definitions for Test Cases One Hundred Ninety-Four through Two Hundred
Eleven
Trait TC194 TC195 TC196 TC197 TC198 TC199 TC198 TC199 TC200 TC201
O
L
L
L
L
N
N
N
N
H
H
C
H
H
H
N
H
H
H
L
H
H
E
H
H
N
H
H
H
L
H
H
L
A
H
N
H
H
H
L
H
H
L
H
N
N
H
H
H
L
H
H
H
N
N
Trait TC202 TC203 TC204 TC205 TC206 TC207 TC208 TC209 TC210 TC211
O
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
C
L
H
H
N
L
L
N
N
H
H
E
H
H
N
H
H
N
H
L
L
N
A
H
N
H
H
N
H
L
H
N
L
N
N
L
L
L
H
H
H
H
H
H
By exhaustively testing every case in the problem domain, and by comparing the results
of these cases against one another, the author expected to be able to identify common trends and
errors in the computational models. Additionally, the results from this exhaustive testing could
be used in future works as baseline data or as comparison points for data generated by human
testing.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The synthetic personality models proposed above were implemented and tested as
specified in Chapter Three. Data from the entire problem domain was collated and examined,
and when viewed from a trait definition perspective (e.g. considering all cases with a high
Extroversion and low Neurosis, etc.), the following general trends emerged:
1. High Agreeableness has more impact on emotional response that does any Neurosis
value.
2. Emotional response mirrors the baseline data if and only if: either both Agreeableness
and Neurosis are neutral or both Openness and Neurosis are neutral while Extroversion is
not high.
3. In terms of intensity response, Openness has more impact than Neurosis.
4. In order for intensity response to mirror the baseline data, both Openness and Neurosis
must be neutral.
5. Agreeableness can override the impact of high Extroversion in terms of mood response if
and only if Neurosis is neutral.
6. Extremely flat emotional response (large decrease from baseline data) has more impact
on mood than does low or neutral Extroversion.
7. Mood response and average change in mood show a mild decrease if and only if
Extroversion is low and Openness, Agreeableness, and Neurosis are neutral.
8. If Extroversion is neutral, Agreeableness is low and emotions are not flat, mood response
shows a small decrease, while the average change in mood shows a moderate decrease.
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9. Mood response and average change in mood mirror the baseline data if and only if
Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neurosis are neutral.
A total of 4220 test runs were made (twenty runs for each test case), and of those 4220
test runs, the independent observer was able to predict the exact mental state of the synthetic
personality for every input in every run. Given the 100% rate of success, it is concluded that the
theoretical models of synthetic personality presented are logically equivalent to the implemented
synthetic personality for all cases. Therefore, Hypothesis One is accepted.
The data gathered as a result of evaluation method one is summarized in the following
table. The column labeled TC reflects the test case number for the row. The columns labeled O,
C, E, A, N reflect the Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neurosis
trait values used in the test case, with L, N, H indicating a low, neutral or high setting. The
columns labeled ER, IR, MR indicate the emotional result, intensity result, and mood result.
These columns are filled with -, +, BL, or a * to indicate that the result is below baseline, above
baseline, the same as baseline, or different from the baseline data, but as expected, respectively.
Note that in some cases, the model acts as expected but produces different values than the
baseline data. For example, a high agreeableness setting will result in more positive axis
emotions, and so it is expected that mood would show a higher incidence of positivity and that
more intensity will be seen (as inputs won’t signal a change to an alternate state but might cause
intensity state transitions).
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Table 24 - Emotional, Intensity, and Mood Response Results for Test Cases One through Eleven
TC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

O
N
H
N
N
N
N
L
N
N
N
N

C
N
N
H
N
N
N
N
L
N
N
N

E
N
N
N
H
N
N
N
N
L
N
N

A
N
N
N
N
H
N
N
N
N
L
N

N
N
N
N
N
N
H
N
N
N
N
L

ER
BL
BL
BL
BL
+
+
BL
BL
BL
-

IR
BL
+
BL
BL
*
+
BL
BL
*
-

MR
BL
BL
BL
+
*
*
BL
BL
*
*

In Test Case Two, the emotional response and mood response exactly mirrored the
baseline data. The intensity response, however, was elevated. For example, where an input
signaled a transition to an intensity level of 5 in the baseline data, an intensity level of 9 was
observed in Test Case Two. While this large change in intensity was not uniform due to
different intensity weights for each emotion state, the overall elevation was uniform (i.e. every
transition that signals a change in intensity in the baseline data signals a change to a higher
intensity state in this test case).
Psychological theory dictates that individuals with a high Openness factor should mirror
the baseline data in terms of emotion and mood, but should be more intensely emotional. Since
the data indicates this is true for Test Case Two, this test supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Three, no difference in emotional, intensity, or mood response as compared
to the baseline data was observed. Since psychological evidence shows no correlation between
Conscientiousness and emotion, intensity, or mood, Test Case Three supports Hypothesis Two.
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In Test Case Four, emotion and intensity was indistinguishable from the baseline data,
while mood was shown to be markedly more positive. In fact, the mood rating never dipped
below the median point in the mood scale, and after the first two inputs in the sequence, showed
an average value of 0.78 on a 0.0 to 1.0 scale. By way of comparison, the baseline data average
for the same range was 0.09. In addition, when tested on four sequential inputs that evaluate to
the joy state, the baseline case showed an increase of 0.2 in mood, while Test Case Four shows
an increase of 0.3. When faced with five sequential inputs that evaluate to anger, the baseline
case showed a decrease in mood of 0.35, whereas this test case showed a decrease of only 0.04.
Since psychological evidence indicates that individuals with a high Extroversion factor
are expected to have a more positive mood, this test case supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Five, both intensity and mood response was as expected, although
substantially different from the baseline data. This difference is due to the expected changes
within the model caused by the change from normal emotion state transitions and the transitions
induced by a high Agreeableness factor. Specifically, the high Agreeableness factor caused the
emotion response for this test case to become ‘trapped’ in the joy state. Since every input
resulted in a self-loop transition on the joy state, an intensity transition was triggered for every
input. Similarly, since the mood model is impacted by the emotion state, and since the emotion
state for this test case was always a positive one, mood was positive for every input as well.
FFM theory predicts that individuals with a high Agreeableness factor show a higher
incidence of positive emotion. The data from Test Case Five clearly supports this prediction and
therefore, this test case supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Six, both emotion response and intensity response was elevated with respect
to the baseline data. Specifically, in response to inputs that did not trigger a transition to another
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emotion state in the baseline case, this test case changed state every time. Also, as in Test Case
Two, the overall elevation of intensity was uniform. Mood response was as expected but
different from that of the baseline run. As in the previous case, this is a result of the change in
emotion state.
Evidence from clinical trial shows that highly Neurotic individuals are more emotionally
labile, both in terms of escalation of intensity and in terms of changes in emotion state. Test
Case Six supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Seven, the intensity response was decreased, while emotion and mood
response was identical to the baseline case. For example, an input that caused an intensity
change to 8 in the baseline data only signaled a change to an intensity level of 3 in this test case.
As in Test Case Two, the amount of change was dependent on the emotion state, but the uniform
decrease in response was seen.
Since Openness is correlated with emotional intensity in psychology research, Test Case
Seven supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Eight, no difference between the baseline data and data derived from this
test case was observed. Since there is no correlation between Conscientiousness and emotion,
intensity or mood in the FFM theory, this test case supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Nine, both the emotion response and the intensity response mirror that found
in the baseline case. Mood response was found to be lower than that of the baseline data.
Specifically, the average mood of the character after it moved away from its disposition setting
was 0.04 in this test case, as opposed to 0.09 in the baseline data. Also, in the four inputs
designed to maintain the joy state, the baseline case changed 0.2 mood points. In this case,
however, the same inputs resulted in a change of 0.035. Similarly, for an input signaling a
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change from the joy state to the disgust state, the baseline data showed a change of -0.1, while
this test case produced a change of -0.17. A true comparison of the effect of sequential negative
axis emotions on mood was limited due to the constraint of the mood model, which limits mood
to a minimum value of 0.0, and based on the fact that mood was so universally low, a single
transition into any negative axis emotion usually resulted in a mood value of 0.0.
Since psychological evidence indicates that individuals with a low Extroversion factor
are expected to have a more negative mood, this test case supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Ten, emotional response was uniformly negative. No input signaled a
change into a positive emotion state. As such, intensity differed from that seen in the baseline
data, but functioned as expected within the model. Similarly, mood was lowered as expected in
the model, which differed from the baseline data.
Since psychological trials show that individuals with a lower Agreeableness factor show
a higher incidence of negative emotion, the data from Test Case Ten clearly supports this
prediction and therefore, this test case supports Hypothesis Two.
In Test Case Eleven, both emotion and intensity response were completely bottomed out.
This also impacted mood, since the character never transitioned out of its initial state of joy, but
the impact in mood response is as defined in the model. As expected from psychological data, a
low Neurosis factor produces an emotionally flat character, and therefore Test Case Eleven
supports Hypothesis Two.
Since every test case evaluated by method one support Hypothesis Two, and since no
other test cases can be found to evaluate the method, Hypothesis Two is accepted.
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Therefore, since both Hypotheses have been accepted, and since no counter examples
were found, it is concluded that this project successfully created psychologically relevant
implementations of synthetic personality, and synthetic personality dynamics.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FUTURE WORK
The long term goal of this line of research is to create characters that are able to
successfully pass the Turing test with regard to intentionality. The first step along these lines is
to create and verify the models and is accomplished in this work. Following this verification, the
cognitive models could be expanded to include more robust behavior and more expressive
responses. To that end, the CBR implemented in the current work could be expanded to
implement a more complex lexical matching scheme and a more expressive response generation
scheme.
Lexical matching in the expanded model would follow the algorithm specified below:
1. For each user query, a query tree will be created. This tree will contain three subtrees of queries, defined by:
a. Starting with the full sentence, recursively replacing the last word in the
sentence with an “anything” token (an asterisk). This will be called the
“minimal” sub-tree.
b. Starting with the full sentence, recursively replacing the first word in the
sentence with an “anything” token. This will be called the “expanded”
sub-tree.
c. Prefixing each query in the minimal sub-tree with an “anything” token.
This will be called the “maximal” sub-tree.
2. For each sub-tree, minimal, expanded, and maximal, the case library will be
traversed, searching for a match.
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3. The response will be selected based on the depth into each sub-tree, with the
preference given to the shallowest tree.
4. In the case of a tie, the preference will be given to the minimal sub-tree, then the
expanded sub-tree.
For example, if the user input is: “I want a piece of cake”, the minimal sub-tree would be:
1. I want a piece of cake
2. I want a piece of *
3. I want a piece *
4. I want a *
5. I want *
6. I *
7. *
The expanded sub-tree would be:
1. I want a piece of cake
2. * want a piece of cake
3. * a piece of cake
4. * piece of cake
5. * of cake
6. * cake
7. *
The maximal sub-tree would be:
1. * I want a piece of cake
2. * I want a piece of *
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3. * I want a piece *
4. * I want a *
5. * I want *
6. * I *
7. *
By searching for the most explicit match first, the system would be optimized towards
finding high-fidelity matches. By setting the precedence as minimal-expanded-maximal, the
author would ensure that same-subject phrases are matched before different-subject phrases, and
that complete sentence matches would take priority over phrase-only matches. This algorithm
implements lexical matching of sentences and would further allow the synthetic character to
display lexical intentionality and automatic cognition. It also would better implement Staats’
psychological behaviorism theory and would fill the role of the linguistic-cognitive repertoires
for the current work.
To fulfill the ‘new case adoption’ requirement of the CBR algorithm, a system of
analogical learning could be implemented in which novel patterns that do not have current
matches in the case library would be added to the knowledge base. This learning system would
be implemented lexically by allowing the system to match synonyms in the stimulus and create
new cases by combining the new stimuli with the response of the synonymous case found. For
example, if the case identified by the stimulus-response pair: “I want a piece of cake”-“I love
cake!” exists in the case library, and a novel stimulus: “I desire a piece of cake” is presented
without an explicit match in the database, a new case that contains: “I desire a piece of cake”-“I
love cake!” will be added to the case library. Similarly, the pattern-response pair: “I want a
piece of cake”-“I love cake!” could be transformed to fit the novel stimuli: “I want a piece of
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pie”, by substituting the word “pie” for the word “cake” in the original case. These synonymbased transformations could be accomplished through the use of the WordNet lexical database
for the English language (WordNet, 2004).
The analogical learning approach specified in the previous paragraph would also partially
fulfill the creative problem solving requirement of the cognitive model. The addition of a set of
production rules that are capable of more robust pattern-response transformations, semantic
context mapping, and understanding would also be required.
Once the models of personality and personality dynamics have been verified, next steps
include testing the models with human users, with possible hypotheses being:
1. Participants will be able to correctly label the emotional state of synthetic
characters based on pre-generated dialog.
2. Participants will be able to correctly label the general personality types of
synthetic characters based on pre-generated dialog.
3. Participants will report a higher sense of engagement, interactivity, and realism
for synthetic characters with the ability to communicate lexical and creative
intentionality than for those characters without this ability based on real-time,
constraint response conversation.
A survey could be designed to verify that the intention of the character is communicated.
Questions would assess both positive and negative responses. That is, if the response is meant to
communicate that the character is in a good mood and is highly extroverted, the user would be
asked if he agrees that the character is friendly, and that he disagrees that the character is
reserved or aloof. These types of questions could be answered with a Likart scale, in which “I
don’t know” is identified at a no-value answer. Additionally, the surveys would explicitly define
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the terms being used to avoid confusion. The results of these surveys would identify whether the
characters can convey intentionality appropriately while isolating negative experience factors
that might be introduced by interacting with a computer.
Results from this study would identify whether the theories advanced by the author in
terms of personality dynamics are effective. An additional study meant to identify whether these
theories can be applied by a synthetic character in a conversation held in real time could follow.
In this manner, successes and failures can be properly identified and the causal factors
determined.
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